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"Give at your tired, your poor,
Tour huddled a u m  yearning to breaths free, 
The wretched refuse of your teealng shore,
Send these, the hoaeless, tempest-toseed to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden shore"
Sana Lazarus
"Almost every disgruntled element that got 
into trouble in its own country has pleaded 
for adaission into the United States on 
the ground that they were oppressed at hoae."
Rep. John £• Rankin 
Mississippi
t
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis will analyse the policies of United States 
Government officials and the attitudes of the American Public 
related to the displaced persons in Europe during the years 
1933-1952.
In so doing, the paper will review the background of the 
situation, and then more critically analyse the years both 
during and after the war, with regard to the Congress, Presidents, 
Executive Departments, and citisens of the United States.
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*II. BACKGROUND
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST IN SHE REFUGEE CRISIS: 1933-1939
In order to understand how the problems of displaced persons 
In Europe were handled, one must have some background information 
as to the history of the problem. This would include a brief 
discussion of the actions of the United States with regard to 
refugees up to the outbreak of the Second World War.
The outbreak of the war was, of course, provoked by Germany. 
With the rise of Nazism in that country, refugees were created 
almoat overnight before th« war even started. From 1933 on, laws 
were created in Germany which forced certain people, particularly 
Jewish people, out of German society.
"On January 30. 1933* Hitler was named Chan­
cellor. •.by the beginning of February the Hitler 
government had banned all Communist meetings and 
shut down the Communist press. Social Democrat 
rallies we.'e either forbidden*..or broken up and 
leading Socialist newspapers were continually 
suspended. Even the Catholic Center Party did 
not escape the Nazi terror...."1
Of course, the Jewish citizens of Germany were the ones 
that would suffer the most in Germany during this period.
"To Hitler, as he had publicly declared a 
thousand times, the Jews were not Germans, and 
though he did not exterminate them at once (only 
a relative few thousand were robbed, beaten or 
murdered during the first months), he Issued laws 
excluding them from public servioe. the universi­
ties and the professions. And on April 1, 1933,
< he proclaimed a national boycott of Jewish shops."2
This was only the beginning of the persecution of the
Jews in Germany,
-1-
"the so-called Nuremberg Laws of September 
15» 1935* deprived the Jews of Gecvan citizen­
ship. confining than to the status of 'subjects'.
It alao forbade marriage between Jews and Aryans 
ae well ae extramarital relatione between then, 
and it prohibited Jewe from employing female Ar-ian servants under thirty-five yeare of age. n the next few yeare some thirteen deorees supplementing the Nuremberg Laws would outlaw 
the Jew completely."^
This elimination ?f people from Qeman society resulted in 
the first trickllngs of a refugee problem in Europe. People 
left Germany while tiey could and fled elsewhere. Others were
forcefully deported from the country and refused admission else­
where. In 1938, "ten thousand Jews had been deported to Poland 
in boxcars."** They were denied admission into Poland upon their 
arrival and were left on the Polish border. After the 
which incorporated Austria into Greater Germany, life became ex­
ceedingly difficult for Austria's Jews, most of whoa resided in 
Vienna. These people alao contributed to the migration problem.
"By 1939. according to the German census, 
apparently 260,000 Jews had already migrated, and 
some 12,000 were reported as being in concentration 
camps. In addition. 130,000 Jewish refugees fled 
from Austria following the Anschluss of 12 March 
1938, and another 17,000 escaped from the Sudeten- 
land following its annexation by Germany on 1 
October 1938. Wiese Jews and perhaps 5,000 more 
who fled from Danzig and Memel at the time of 
annexation, brought the total for pre-war Jewish 
refugees from Greater Germany to *£0,000 persons. 
This total, when deducted from the 1,152,000 
European refugees reported as having arrived in 
some thirty countries during 1933-39, minus approx­
imately 330,000 refugee Republican Spaniards who 
migrated to Francs, gives a total of 382,000 non- 
Jewiah refugees from Greater Germany during the 
period from 1933—1939*""
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While all df this migration was occurring, the rest of the 
world stood by and did absolutely nothing to help the people who
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were fleeing from persecution. The United States was just as 
guilty as the rest of the world. Although President Roosevelt 
tried to ease Immigration regulations somewhat, allowing the 
number of refugees coming in to increase slightly, no plan for 
action on the refuge* problem wae undertaken by the United States 
until 1938. This was five full years after derm any began offic­
ially persecuting many of its citizens.
Between 1933 and 1939, the United States admitted only 
"136,900 refugees of the total number of 1,131,623 pre-war refu­
gees who fled several European countries."* The reason for this 
was that the United States retained the quota system and no suc­
cessful programs were put into use to aid the refugees of Europe.
As the Mew York Times stated on March 26, 1938, "Mr. Roosevelt 
made it clear that in extending the helping hand to the oppressed 
of other lands, this country had no Intention of enlarging or re­
vising its immigration quotas."?
Unfortunately, operation under the normal quota system could 
not possibly have done anything to relieve or aid the situation 
which was progressively getting worse. Newspapers across the nation 
carried statements by anti-immigration groups almost daily. Many 
of these organizations asked for a ban on immigration altogether.
For example, the Mew York Times stated on October 20, 1938 that, 
"etopping immigration 'from whatever source' until the present 
unemployment crisis abates was urged in a resolution adopted yes­
terday. • .by the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United
g
States...." This group was only one of many to urge bans on immig­
ration. "The Patriotic and Fraternal Junior Order United American
Mechanics, restrletionist since 1853, saw each new (refugee)
arrival as 'an added threat to the ultimate solving of the econ­
omic situation in the United States.'"*
The question or refugee immigration and unemployment came up 
in 1937 ana 1936 after Roosevelt had eased up on previously strict 
immigration regulations in order to try and help some of the Ger- 
man refugees. In the decade before, an anti-immigration sentiment 
west through the nation and the restrictlonist immigration policies 
were enacted. With Roosevelt's attempted aid, the reatrlctionists 
felt they were losing their hold on these policies.
"Veterans of the anti-immigration struggle 
of the 1920's and after seized the occasion to 
press for a total stoppage of admission of foreign­
ers. People who had formerly paid little heed 
to the restriction!sts' viewpoints were now ready 
for their message. In a milieu of insecurity born 
of nearly a decade of depression, urban lower- and 
lower-middle class elements were especially prone 
to fear and resentment toward newcomers. Partic­
ularly in New York City, the main area of refugee 
penetration, strong feeling developed against 
the refugee as a job competitor."10
As stated previously, until 1936 the United States made no 
attempts to alleviate the refugee crisis. In light of the sit­
uation with regard to public sentiment against immigration, Pres­
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt made an attempt to put together a 
program to aid the refugees.
"On March 24, 1938, the State Department announced that it 
had sent notes to twenty-nine European and South American coun­
tries asking them to participate in an international conference 
on German refugees. Since the United States had not taken part 
in any of the previous international efforts to solve the problem, 
the new proposal greatly raised the hopes of those sympathetic 
to the refugees." 1
Many comments about the conference have been made. Mont of
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them deal with the fact that the conference was a failure.
Henry Feingold, Assistant Professor of History at the City Univ­
ersity of New York stated, "the invitation was astonishing because 
Roosevelt chose to intrude into a situation in which he was vir­
tually powerless to act, barred as he was by a highly restrictive 
immigration law".1^ Roosevelt knew from the start that bringing 
refugees into the United States under existing law would be im­
possible. Any analysis of his statements when the conference was 
announced should make it obvious that Roosevelt had no Intentions 
of making any attempt to get Congress to relax the laws or find 
some way to go around them. With the announcement of the confer­
ence, "the Ctate Department made/it clear that the contemplated 
program envisioned no changes in immigration policy. 'Further-i 
more, it should be understood,' ran the text of the notes, 'that 
no country would be expected or asked to receive a greater num­
ber of immigrants than is permitted by its existing legislation.'"1^
Although there was some opposition by certain groups, 
especially "fraternal" societies to the conference, "the President's 
actions to facilitate migration of persecuted people seemingly 
drew a very positive response. Qeneral press coverage was heavy 
and almost wholly favorable."1if
With this generally positive public response, why were there 
no attempts made to ease immigration law? Furthermore, why would 
any nation want to participate in a conference that, due to the 
existing laws could not do much about the refugee problem? Pro­
fessor Herbert Druks of Brooklyn College suggests that, "the 
states participating at Evian...had accepted invitations only 
'because they did not wish to appear before international opinion
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as completely standing aside,' and that the U.S. was no better
since its quotas were such that 'little possible action' could
be expected". * Germany continued to persecute, the United States
and other nations continued to watch.
Of course, the Congress was just as responsible as anyone
else for the failure of the conference due to the immigration laws.
From the time President Roosevelt made the announcement about the
Evian Conference on, the Congressional Record shows an almost
constant anti-immigration discourse. The theme of "Let's Save
America for the Americans" is repeated constantly. For example,
House Representative Rankin of Mississippi stated,
"we cannot afford to throw down the bars of immigra­
tion, or open wide our gates to every disgruntlea 
element throughout the world. Instead of inviting 
more aliens to add to our troubles, I would much 
prefer to see us deport a great many who are here 
now.... Almost every disgruntled element that got 
into trouble in its own country has pleaded for 
admission into the United States on the ground that 
they were oppressed at home.... I am not now in 
favor of making my country the dumping ground for 
the riff-raff of the Old World.... As members of 
Congress representing the American people, we 
should carry out that policy (of restricting immi­
gration) and save America for Americans".'® Appl­
ause followed this comment.
Of course, this was not the only outrageous remark that 
shot across the House floor at the time. Representative Jenkins 
of Ohio stated, "our President seems bound to embroil us in Euro­
pean entanglements. He now is asking the people of the United 
States to make a haven here for those who are undesirable to human 
dictators.... When he gave out to the nations of Europe the start­
ling invitation to participate with him in removing from Europe 
these thousands of political refugees he launched on a program 
unprecedented in our history.... It would be much better for us 
to take these people to some uncongested part of the world".
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Before the Svian Conference began in July, 1933, President 
Roosevelt had made plans for the conference. His plan was "to 
have the participating states, supported by private funds provide 
asylum to the refugees according to existing immigration restric­
tions and quotas.... He invited some leading American figures to 
a White House conference, called to find funds for future settle­
ment projects, it was then that a President's Advisory Committee 
on Political Refugees was organized."1® This committee had met 
before the conference and attempted to discuss methods of action 
to be brought up at the conference. Unfortunately, nothing work­
able came up. For example, "Rabbi Stephen S. Wise made a sugges­
tion that Britain be urged to liberalize its Palestine Policy.
The Committee insisted that the Palestine question would 'stir up 
bitter passions and might even lead to disruption of the entire 
conference'."1^  And so, this question, like many others were never 
brought before the conference.
On July 6, 1938, the conference opened. Myron C. Taylor, 
former Chairman of the Board of United States Steel "had agreed 
to serve as chief representative for the United States.... In the 
opening speech, he stated that the United States contribution 
lay in making the German-Austrian quota of 27,730 fully available. 
As the session proceeded, delegate after delegate excused his 
country from any increased acceptance of refugees".2®
The only country which made any substantial offer was the 
Dominican Republic which "volunteered to contribute large, but 
unspecified areas for agricultural development."21 The gist of 
the conference was summed up quite well in an article from Newsweek.
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"Chairman Taylor opened proceedings: 'The time has come when 
governments...must act and act promptly.' Most governments 
represented acted promptly by slamming their doors against Jewish 
refugees.... Only Mexico and the Dominican Republic promised havens 
with no restrictions attached."22
Unfortunately, the Dominican Republic's substantial offer 
of admission to 100,000 Qerman-Jewiah refugees never amounted to 
much.
"On July 9, 1938. Virgilio Trujillo-Molina delighted 
the weary delegates by announcing his government's 
willingness to accept 100,000 refugees...."23 These 
refugees were supposed to be agriculturalists.
"Hailed as a major breakthrough in the refugee ques­
tion by Roosevelt, the Dominican offer was little 
more than an empty gesture by a self-seeking despot.
The Trujillo regime received a good deal of favor­
able publicity as a result of its announcement, 
but it never intended >to really succor the desper­
ate Jews of Qermany. It is doubtful whether more 
than a handful of the 600,000 highly urbanized 
Jews of Austria-Qermany could have satisfied the 
entry requirement of 'agriculturalists with an 
impeachable record'.... By the end of 1941 the 
Dominican Republic Settlement Corporation, chart­
ered in October. 1939 with Washington's approval 
placed a mere 5o0 Jewish, families in what was 
formerly Santo Domingo"^
"The one solid accomplishment of the Evian Conference was 
. the establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees 
as a permanent organisation.»2  ^ "The primary task of the new 
agency would be twofold. It would undertake a search for resettle­
ment havens and would seek to negotiate with Berlin over the ref- 
26
ugeoa."&° Unfortunately, this "solid accomplishment" would amount 
to nothing but empty words and wasted breath over the next few 
months which remained until the war broke out.
The flret problem encountered by Qeorge Rublee, who had been 
appointed as director of the Committee, was to establish communications 
with Oermpay.
mdteJk.A •* * . • ..V i
"Instituting negotiations with Qeraany for a 
policy of orderly emigration of refugee* withSart of their capital, encountered four months of elay. The initial obstacle was inability to assemble the five officers of the I.G.C.R. for 
the first planning meeting with Rublee. Great 
Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands 
were willing to commit themselves to the prog­
ram* ..at least to the extent of naming perman­
ent representatives. Franc* and Brasil, the 
other nations expeoted to send officials, were 
not* After a week's hesitation. Franc* relented*
On August 31 the officers met with Ruble* des­
pite the absence of the Brasilian delegate*"2?
In less than twenty-four hours after the initial meeting,
the Intergovernmental Committee began to fall apart.
"On September 1,** Brasil resigned its seat.
The next day Argentina barred all further 
immigration, arguing that it had a higher 
percentage of Jews than any other nation*
On September 13* Chile.••formally withdrew 
from the I.G.C.R. Within two weeks, the three 
most industrialised Latin American nations re­
nounced all Interest in refuge* matters*••
From London, Rublee wrote Cordell Hull that 
fall:'With the exception of the United States 
and the United Kingdom, doors have been sys­
tematically closed everywhere to involuntary 
emigrants since the meeting at Eyian.",2°
Numerous problems were encountered with proceeding any 
further because of the British. The first involved the problem 
of leadership which was settled when Earl Winterton was appoin­
ted Chairman of the Committee* Next to get in the way of negot­
iations was the problem of establishing communications with 
Germany. The problem seemed to stem from the British who were 
busy with their policy of appeasement sad did not wait anyone 
interfering with it. The British were responsible for getting 
through to Germany and arranging the talks. As George Ruble* 
stated, "to put it bluntly, I have no indication that the Germans 
are reluctant to talk. It is apparent to me, however, that the 
British are reluctant to have a* talk with the Germans."^Neville
Chamberlain w u  too busy running around Qsrnany appeasing Hitler 
to let anyone talk to the Germans about refugees. The crisis of 
the Sudetenland had given the British an excuse to avoid arranging 
the negotiations. The month of September was occupied by the 
"meeting at Berchtesgaden...where Chamberlain gave Hitler the 
Sudeten area...and then the Hunlth Conference of September 29 where 
Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier and Chamberlain decided to officially 
withdraw support from Czechoslovakia and hand it over to Germany".
The policy of appeasement seamed to be relaxed a bit after 
Krlatallnacht (the Night of Broken Glass) which had resulted in 
public opinion beginning to discredit Chamberlain's policy. On 
November 10, 1936, the Germans pulled off the biggest pogrom ag&inst 
the Jews yet. Aside from the destruction, death and torture which 
was inflicted on the Jews in this government-sponsored and organ­
ized pogrom, Jews were now completely cut-out of German life. 
Worldwide public opinion turned against Germany, who was struggling 
to keep exonomic ties open with several nations including Britain.
Dp to this point, Myron C. Taylor had been unable to arrange 
for negotiations with the Germans himself. In light of world senti­
ment against Germany, on "the morning of December 13, 1938, the 
American Charge d'Affairs in England notified Washington that 
Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank and minister without 
portfolio in the Nazi Cabinet was to visit London to discuss the 
Jewish problem...with several British experts attached to the League 
Commission on Refugees.... Rubles was invited to join the discussion"
Before discussing the negotiations with Germany, it is im­
portant to take a few moments and discuss President Roosevelt's
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reaction to the events in Europe at that time.
At the President's press conference of Tuesday, November 15, 
1933, he mace the following statement in regard to the situation 
in Qermany: "Nows of tho past few days in Germany has deeply shocked
public opinion in tho United States.... 1 myself coulu scarcely be­
lieve that such things could occur in a twentieth-century civil­
ization. With a view to gaining a first-hand picture of the 
current situation in Germany, I asked the Secretary of State to 
order our Ambassador in Berlin to return at once for report and
"Oconsultation."-^
The President was shockod about the treatment of tho Jews in 
Germany, but uid he take any action at that time to help them?
At the some press conference a reporter invoke- the following 
discourse:
"Question: 'Have you made any protest to Germany?'
The President: 'Nothing has gone that I know of.'
question: 'Mr. President, can you tell us whether 
you feel that there is any place in the v/orl . 
where you could tako core of mass emigration 
of the Jews from Germany —  have you given 
thought to that?'
The Presideut; 'I have given a great uoal of 
thought to it.'
Question: 'Can you tell us any place particularly 
desirable?'
The President: 'No, the time is not ripe for that.'
Question: 'Would you recommend a relaxation of 
our immigration restrictions so that the 
Jewish refugees could be received in this 
country?'
The President: 'That is not in contemplation, we 
have the quota system.'"2*f
The President could have at least attempted to pressure the 
British into opening up Palestine, but he did not. Furthermore, 
he made no appeals to Congress to ease immigration restrictions.
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However, three days later he stated that refugees from Germany 
and Austria that were here on visitor's permits would be allowed 
to stay in this country "under the six month extension provision". ^ 
Roosevelt granted renewal of the extensions in the "interests of 
humanity," as he put it, so that these refugees were not sent 
back to Europe.
Die negotiations with Germany began on December 1$, 1938. 
HJalmar Sohaoht, President of the Reichsbank, arrived in London 
with a proposal for the emigration of Jews from Germany. Muoh 
speculation has been given as to the cause of Germany's sudden 
decision to negotiate. The most likely reason is that Germany 
was economically choking due to boycotts Invoked by the Western 
Democracies* This is also the reason that the plan proposed by 
Schaeht was baaed on economics. At the outset of discussion there 
was left one large question to be answered. Where would the ref* 
ugees go to once allowed to emigrate from Germany?
At the outset of negotiations, "Schacht estimated that therd 
were 600,000 'racial' Jews in Greater Germany (including Austria 
and the Sudettnland). Of these, 200,000 would remain in Germany 
(without persecution) because their age and other factors made 
then unsuitable for resettlement. The plan called for the exodus 
of 150,000 wage earners...to be followed by their dependents over 
a three-year period. Schacht did not share the British Foreign 
Office's concern about where these people would go. The resettle­
ment was the responsibility of the I.G.C.R. He suggested that 
they be resettled anywhere temporarily. The most important thing 
was to get them out of Germany at the earliest possible moment".^
*
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"In outlining the financing of his plan. 
Schacht estimated the value of Jewish property 
in Germany at about six billion marks. Under his 
proposal, one ana one-half billion of this wculd 
be placed in a trust fund in Germany. Jews out­
side Germany would then raise an equivalent 
amount in foreign currency. This capital, in 
the form of a loan secured upon the Jewish 
property held in trust, would be available to 
emigrating Jews to use in establishing them­
selves outside Germany. Interest and amortiz­
ation of the loan would be ehrged against the 
Jewish property in the trust fund.... Schacht's 
proposal stipulated that the non-German curr­
encies needed to service the projected debt would 
have to come from an increase of German exports 
over their usual level."37
American response to the plan was not good. Officials in 
government and even leaders of Jewish groups felt that the plan 
was ransom, and that if it could be successfully carried out,
Germany may try similar things with other groups of unwanted people. 
However, nearly everyone agreed that the plan should not be scrapped 
totally. George Rublee then proposed certain revisions based 
on a similar plan of his own. This became known as the "Rubles 
Plan" and it was presented to the Germans in Berlin.
To avoid the problem Of the fund being financed by Jews from 
the Western Nations, which would make Germany's theory of international 
Jewry appear true, a revision was discussed by Rublee and Sumner 
Welles. "In this scheme a central financial organization was to 
be established in London with an initial funding of 950 million 
•>ome of which would be financed by Germany. The function of this 
agency was to sponsor settlement projects for refugees and to 
assist them through loans. The officers of the bank would be 
international financiers Instead of Nazi 'trustees'. The bank 
would be self-sustaining because expenditures would be in the form 
of loans instead of grants."38
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"Rublee arrived in Berlin on January 10, 1939.... After 
two days of unproductive talks the Germans broke off negotiations 
to study the 'modifications' in the plan made by Welles. When 
discussions resumed on January 21, Rublee was dumbfounded by 
the Germans rejection of 'Welles' loan plan. The next day, dis­
cussions were postponed once more and Rublee learned that Schacht 
had been removed from his position as Reichsbank president."^
Negotiations were continued with Hermann Soaring and Schacht's 
successor, Helmut Wohlthat of the German Economics Ministry.
Rublee got the Germans to make some concessions. One was that the 
international "organization for financing would be established, 
but without German assistance".^ The Germans did not keep some 
of the other concessions in Rubles's plan.
The United States approved the Rublee plan. "George Rublee 
resigned as director and was replaced by Sir Herbert Emerson, League 
High Commissioner for Refugees.
Much time elapsod before the organization of the Coordinating 
Foundation was complete. This was the name given to the foundation 
which would finance the plan. On "July 30, 1939* the Coordinating 
Foundation came into ead. stance".1*2 Unfortunately, two things hap­
pened before any work could be done. "On May 17, 1939, the British 
Government had issued the White Paper which restricted total Jewish
immigration to 75*000 persons over the next five years into Pales- 
45tine."^ On June 8, 1959, President Roosevelt, in light of the 
fact that there was little cooperation from the other nations 
declared that the I.G.C.R. would be made inactive and that it should 
"maintain only a skeletal staff in London, paid from voluntary con­
tributions ' as member governments might consider appropriate'
% *
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Although the Coordinating Foundation came into existence 
in July, the only money it had to work with came primarily from 
American Jewish organizations, specifically the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee. By that time, it was too late for 
anything to be done. The aemocrauies in Europe were too entangled 
in the impending crisis and forgot about the refugees. "Hitler 
marchec his troops into Poland on the pretext that the Poles hau 
not accepted his demeubds for restoration to the Reich of Danzig 
and the Polish Corridor, mid Great Britain and France declared 
war on Germany on September 3, 1 9 3 9 . Six years into the ref­
ugee crisis ano still virtually nothing had been aone to solve it.
III. THE WAR YEARS: 1959-19A5 
A. THE TEH TED STATES CONGRESS
The U.S. Congress was hardly sympathetic to the plight of 
the refugees in Europe during the war years. Any legislation pro­
posed to axci the people of Europe was dismissed by the legislature 
as soon as possible. It did not seem to matter if the legislation 
was intended only to aid helpless children) Congress always seemed 
to find a way cut of it.
The first significant attempt to pass legislation to aid ref­
ugees was the ./ogner-Rogers Bill or Child Refugee Bill. The bill 
was introduced in the Senate by Robert F. V/agner of Hew York* In 
tke Houset Edith Hourse Rogers of Massachusetts introduced the 
bill. The Resolution (Senate Joint Resolution 6 k  t House Joint 
Resolution I6fl) was introduced in early 1939 and reau as follows!
"Joint Resolution to authorize the admission 
into the United States of a limited number of German 
Refugee Children.
"V/hereas there is now in progress a world-wide 
effort to facilitate the emigration from Germany of 
man, women, and children of every race and creed 
suffering from conditions which compel them to 
seek refuge in other lands; and
Whereas the most pitiful and helpless suffer­
ers are children of tender years: and
Whereas the admission into the United States 
of a limited number of these children can be accom­
plished without any danger of their becoming public 
charges, or dislocating American industry or dis­
placing American labor; and
Whereas such action by the United States 
would constitute the most immediate and practical 
contribution by our libcry-loving people to the 
cause of human freedom, to which we are lnsever- 
ably bound by our institutions, our history, and 
our profoundest sentiments; How, therefore be it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Represen­
tatives of the united States of America in Congress 
assembled, that not more than ten thousand immig­
ration vimas may be issued during each of the
calendar years 1939 and 1940, In addition to 
those authorised by existing law and notwith­
standing any provisions of law regarding 
priorities or preference, for the admission 
into the United States of children fourteen 
years of age or under, who reside, or at any 
tine since January 1, 1933, have resided, In any 
territory now Incorporated In Qermany and who 
arc otherwise eligible: Provided that satis­
factory assurances are given that such children 
will be supported and properly cared for through 
the voluntary action of responsible citizens 
or responsible private organizations of the 
United States and,consequently will not become 
public charges."**®
In discussing what occurred with the Wagner-Rogers act it is 
important to note two aspects of this bill. In the third paragraph 
the bill states that these children can be admitted without becom­
ing public charges} and In the lust paragraph it states that the 
children will be admitted if satisfactory assurances are given that 
the children will be supported. In other words, if there was no 
way to support the children without government aid, they could not 
have been admitted. This is important because most of the opposition 
to letting these children in came from people and organizations 
who felt that the children would be an extra burden on the nation.
Senate subcommittee hearings on the bil] took place on April 
20-24, 1939 and House hearings took place on May 24-June 1, 1939*
It becomes obvious when one reads through the texts of those hear- 
ings that many more of the witnesses who appeared were in favor 
of passage of the bill than were against passage of it. Contrary 
to that, it seems that more of the members of Congress were against 
it than were in favor of it. Of course, this is obvious from the 
fact that the bill did not pahs. However, this attitude seemed 
to prevail even at the beginning of the hearings.
For example, throughout the Senate hearings certain members 
of Congress continually nit-picked at the witnesses in favor of
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the bill. Representative Kramer of California seemed to be 
particularly adept at this. During one part of the hearings, Hr. 
Kramer continued to attack a witness on the question of a child 
having affidavits of support to come here and stay with a family.
As the testimony reads,
"Representative KRAMER: ’You mentioned 
affidavits; that we are going to rely on affidavits 
in relation to the future support and maintenance 
of these children....'
Mr. PICKETT (of the American Friends Service 
Committee): 'Yes.'
Representative KRAMER: 'What is that going to 
amount to? I have seen affidavits that have been 
changed and changed and rechanged. I also know 
of a case of an instance where a man made a 
certain affidavit under oath that a certain thing 
happened, and & e r  he made an affidavit that it 
did not happen. He was guilty of perjury and 
was put in the penitentiary, and the Government 
must feed,him and we will let him out in a year 
or two."'W
Representative Kramer continued with his ridiculous examples 
which were totally unrelated to the issue at hand. A few moments 
later Representative Kramer stated that refugee children should 
not be let in because they "eventually will migrate into Califor­
nia which has its hands full right now taking care of its own child­
ren and which will be in danger with respect to taxation."^®
Kramer was not the only person to carrry on this way. During 
the second set of hearings Joseph A. Padway, Counsel for the Amer­
ican Federation of Labor read a statement written by the Federation' 
President which favored passage of the bill. After'Mr. Padway read 
this, three members of the Committee; House Representatives Allen 
(Louisiana), Poage (Texas) and Tslle (Iowa) spent a lengthy amount 
of time interrogating Mr. Padway as to whether or not the letter 
was the position of the A. F. of L . ^
V/ith this type of circus atmosphere prevailing, it is no 
wonder that a decant bill was never passed. Furthermore, it 
is amazing that these types of people were responsible for a 
measure of this importance.
While these hearings were taking place other nations which 
had even less room for immigrants than the United States were 
doing their part to help these children. For example, "the Nether­
lands had reacted to the Krlstallnacht by welcoming seventeen- 
hundred German Jewish children, and overcrowded Belgium admitted 
several hundred more. But the most dramatic response was that of 
Great Britain, which opened it6 crowded island to more than nine 
thousand refugee children."*5
The United States still had not done its part even though 
the plan to move these children had been completely worked out 
by the Quakers with no expense to our government. "The Quakers 
had worked out the complex details of moving the twenty-thousand 
children to the United States. In collaboration with child care 
specialists, physicians, psychologists and refugee organizations 
of all faiths, they developed procedures for the selection, trans­
portation, reception and distribution of the children."*1 Many 
influential people including Mrs. Roosevelt supported the bill.
When the idea of the bill was first brought up, "William LaRoe Jr., 
representative for the Nonsectarian Committee for German Refugee 
Children received U*00 or more letters from people who freely and 
voluntarily offered to take children into their homes."^ This 
was before any attempt to find homes for the children was ever 
made. Eddie Cantor, the popular comedian wrote the following letter 
to Marvin McIntyre, the Presidential Secretary* "My dear Marvin,
for generations to cone, if these boys and girls were permit­
ted entry into this country, they would look upon our leader 
as a saint - they would bless the nane of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
•••• If it net with the approval of the President, and Congress,
1 would furnish you with the names and references of the faailies 
willing to auopt these unfortunate children."^ Even Helen 
Hayes testified that she would adopt a child from Germany at 
the hearings on the bill.
With all of this support Franklin D. Roosevelt did not make 
any effort to get the bill through Congress. McIntyre replied 
to Cant6r that "it would be inadvisable to raise the question of 
increasing quotas...during the present Congress. There is a very 
real feeling that if this question is too prominently raised... 
during the present session, we might get more restrictive rather 
than liberal immigration."^
Arthur D. Morse, author of While Six Million Died: A Chronicle 
of American Apathy, felt that Roosevelt did not approach Congress 
because "he feared the antagonism of Congress, for at that very 
moment he was seeking half a billion dollars from an isolationist 
Congress to expand the Air Corps and to construct Naval bases. The 
President's priority clearly went to defense."^ In regard to 
Eleanor Roosevelt, Morse continued, "many years later Eleanor would 
explain her husband's seeming indifference to crusades in which 
she participated actively. 'While I often felt strongly on various 
subjects,'she wrote in This I Remember. 'Franklin frequently refrain 
ed from supporting causes in which he believed, because of political 
realities,*"^
Even without President Roosevelt's support the measure still
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had a strong backing. Why than, didn't it pass? The basic 
reasons that the bill aid not succeed were that the restrletion- 
ists made heavy use of the phrase "charity begins at hone", 
referring to the fact that these people believed that there 
were too many needy American children who should have been aided 
instead of foreign children. "A flood of concern burst forth for 
sharecropper and city poor children. 'Shall we sentence these 
slum children to crime, poverty, and hopelessness while we import 
children from a foreign country?' asked the American Immigration 
Conference Board in a handbill entitled 'America's Children are 
America's ProblenI Refugee Children in Europe are Europe's Problem!'"^ 
This cry carried weight even though Katharine F. Lenroot, Chief 
of the Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor stated,
"I believe that the admission to this country of refugee children 
in the numbers indicated would not lessen in the slightest degree 
the care and protection afforded a single American child,"
Secondly, it is known that the Seventy-Sixth Congress was 
extremely restrlctionist and had sixty anti-alien proposals intro­
duced into it. "One of the sixty anti-alien proposals introduced 
into the Seventy-Sixth Congress by Representative Stephen Pace of 
Georgia (H.R. 9999), suggested simply that 'every Alien in the 
United States shall be forthwith deported.'"^ Furthermore, "part 
of the support which had been anticipated for the bill never mat­
erialized because of a belief in some circles that the proposal 
would lead to the breakup of German families". ^ Senators who 
were polled in late March, 1939 as to whether they would favor
passage, "reported a preponderant feeling in the Senate that this
*
subject is 'too hot to handle', only Senators were willing to
reveal their views; of these 21 favored the measure ana 24 
opposed it."®1
Host of the oppoeitioh to the bill cane from patriotic and 
restrlctioaiat organizations. It is interesting to note that 
representatives of these groups, aany of then small, were given 
equal time for testimony as was the American Federation of Labor's 
representative. Obviously, the A.F. of L. represented many more 
people than did these other groups. An additional note in anal­
yzing this area of the topic is that "while almost no overtly anti- 
semi tic statements came out in the testimony against the bill, 
the Nation stood on safe ground when it charged that a 'subtle 
and effective argument is the contention that this is
a Jewish bill. The implication is that all of the children are 
Jewish''. In many quarters, this was reason enough for keeping 
them out."^2
By the beginning of June, it seemed certain that the Immig­
ration Committee would not report the bill. "Wagner delivered 
an impassioned radio address nationwide...in an attempt to elicit 
widespread public support at the last moment for his measure. It 
failed to do this, and when the bill emerged from committee on 
June 30, it was with the amendment that the 20,000 children enter 
the country under existing quotas...giving 10,000 of the annual 
27,000 German certificates to the children on a preferential basis 
instead of adding 10,000 to the 27,000."^ Wagner vehemently 
opposed this on the grounds that this measure w„uld further jeo­
pardize the position c$f adults trying to enter the country.
Because of this, the ' bill never came up for a vote.
This was not the end of the refugee debate although it was
the nost widely discussed bill. Robert R. Reynolds of North 
Carolina was staunchly restzlctionist. Throughout the year 
1939» Senator Reynolds made statements in the Senate denouncing 
any attempt to ease immigration restrictions. Reynolds and 
'./ogner were at opposite ends of the table when it came to immigra­
tion. In the same year sis the bill to admit German refugee child­
ren came up, Senator Reynolds Introduced a bill which stated that 
"no quota immigrant shall be admitted into the United States for 
a porlod of five years" When the St nate Committee on Immigra­
tion reported the bill it had tacked on to it'Section 19 which 
was the same piece of legislation that was introduced by Senator 
Wagner and Representative Rogers, This package provided for admis­
sion of twenty-thousand children and no adults. Howover, this 
bill did not pass either*
During the war years there were very few bills in Congress 
that attempted to aid the refugees of Europe, One bill which 
seemed to attract some attention in the nation (aside from the 
V/agner-Rogers bill) was the result of something known as the Slat­
tery Report. This report was a publication of the Department of 
the Interior and it was officially entitled,
Development. The book was published in August, 1939, and it dis­
cussed the facta about Alaska. The book "outlined the riches in 
newsprint and other forest products, tin, seafood, fur and several 
additional resources which awaited fuller development in Alaska. 
Pointing out that the vast territory contained only sixty-thousand 
inhabitants, the report went on to discuss Alaska's slow popula­
tion growth. Tho report blamed this slow growth on the restriction 
of immigration due to the Immj tration Act of 1924 and hinted that
24.
immigration could solve Alaska's p r o b l e m s . O n e  part of the
report stated that '"the people of Alaska...want to see their 
land populate, and it makes little difference whether this pop­
ulation comes from the United States or abro au.• This sparked 
off several poopie who wrote rebuttals to the Department of the 
Interior. President Roosevelt formulated a plan for Immigration 
into Alaska. "The plan involved moving 10,000 settlers into 
Alaska during each of the next five years. Half would come from 
the United States and the other half would come from abroad, the 
Aliens entering Alaska outside tho q u o t a s . P u b l i c  sentiment 
seemed to be in favor of this plar and in March, 1940, it was 
introduced in the Senate by V/illiam H. King of Utah ana in the 
House by Frank Havenner of California. It then became known as the 
King-Havenner Bill.
The bill stated that "each immigrant must be a person between 
the ages of 16 and lf5» or tho spouse or child or adopted child of
Ca
such a person". The bill further stated that each sottler "shall 
not be admitted to citizenship unless he shall have resided contin­
uously in the Territory of Alaska for five years following his 
admission to the Territory and shall have been reclassified as a 
quota i m m i g r a n t . T h i s  clause meant that an immigrant could not 
come to this country and attain citizenship by going through Alaska.
Unfortunately, the bill seemed to have failed to attract wide­
spread support once it was proposed in Congress. This is most like­
ly attributed to the fact that tho residents of Alaska didn't begin 
speaking up against the bill until this time. "A vigorous opposi­
tion arose to counter the meager support which the Ala<4ca Development 
Bill succeeded iu attracting. By far, strongest disapproval came from
ulaskane themselves and for the most part centered on the refugee 
aspect of the measure.”'0 The part of the Alaska plan which the 
nAlaskans ureau and uetest most is the proposed large-scale colon- 
iaatian of the territory by European refugees”.71 "They resent 
the creation of a class restricted to residence in the territory, 
their occupations prescribed by lav/, their residence in the States 
forbidden. Alaskans felt...that such discrimination woula set 
the territory off from the rest of the United States, and thus 
work irreparable harm.”72 David Wyman, in his book Pauar Walla 
r.eeras to find another reason for the Alaskan opposition to the 
bill. A:-: he states, "an editorial in the asserted,
'that it is Jewish capital and that the refugees to be poure*. into 
Alasku if this bill is passcu will be Jewish is o b v i o u s ' t h e  
consensus of opinion in the territory hela that Jews would be the 
least desirable of immigrants because of being the least adaptable 
to Alaskan conditions.'”7'*
Although supporters of the bill attempted to pass the bill 
through committee primarily on the basis that it was on Alaskan 
development bill and secondarily an immigration bill, they failed 
to uo so. Senator Reynolds, the renowned restriction!st contin­
ually turned the discussion at the hearings around so that it app­
eared that the bill was solely an immigration bill. Reynolds 
thought that the bill should only be supported if "its benefits 
are limitec: to American citizens” .7**
The plan to develop Alaska and aid refugees at the sane time 
did not succeed. The bill died in the Committee on Territories 
and Insular Affairs. No further action was ever taken on the 
measure. Again, Congress failed to help the persecuted people of
Europe. This, in spit* of the fact that the immigration quota 
for Germany and Austria was filling up quite rapidly, on Jan­
uary 30, 19^11 the Hew York Tiaya reported that "although the 
current 'immigration year' has five months to go, the full twelve- 
month quotas for Germany, Poland, Czecho-Slovak!a anu Hungary have 
been allotted,"^ "The heavy influx of immigrants from the Axis- 
controlled parts of Central Europe reflected the spread of war 
and its resultant creation of an ever-increasing flow of political 
and racial refugees to the United states",^
At this point, the refugee issue, as far as Congress was 
concerned, became unimportant until after the war.
B. EXECUTIVE BRANCH:
1. PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
No analysis of American policies toward the displaced 
persons would be complete without a discussion of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
It is very hard to ascertain why President Roosevelt behaved 
In the manner he did during the years of crisis. However, it is 
certain that although his policies for internal growth may have 
been quite an aid to the American people, his policies toward 
the refugees in Europe left much to be desired. Aside from the
J
creation of the War Refugee Board, which came late in the tragedy, 
Roosevelt did virtually nothing to aid the refugees.
Certainly President Roosevelt was aware of the attitude and 
behavior of Congress. But through most of the refugee crisis he 
chose not to try and influence Congress. Not only that, but he 
seemed to have kept himself out of the dealings of people in the 
State Department. Roosevelt could have chosen to come to the aid 
of the persecuted, but he chose not to.
We have already discussed some of Roosevelt's behavior in the 
pre-war days. Now we will discuss the actions of the President 
during the war years.
Many of Roosevelt's opinions or ideas about what to do with 
the refugees are made clear through examination of texts of his 
Presidential Press Conferences.
In October, 1939, about six weeks after the outbreak of war in 
Europe, the President was discussing the possibilities of eventual 
settlement of refugees in other areas of the world. At one press 
conference, he had stated that studies would have to be made to see
27
*§»
if these areas were habitable and that these studies should be under­
taken by the Intergovernmental Coanlttee and funded by the neutral 
nations. During this discussion a reporter ahked, "'How about the 
relocation of those in Europe now? The refugees that are now scat­
tered...' The President cut-in and stated that,'that is a relativ­
ely ainor subjeot that ought to be taken care of by private funds 
within the next year or two.'"'? The Intergovernmental Committee 
became defunct shortly thereafter and even at that time, there were 
thousands of refugees in need of aid. Yet, Roosevelt considered 
them a "ainor subject".
Even after the creation of the War Refugee Board in 1944, 
Roosevelt's attitude toward the displaced persons was a little hard 
to comprehend. The President suggested that temporary havens for 
refugees be set-up. At a press conference in June, 1944, one 
reporter asked to clarify whether the President intended for these 
temporary havens to be in the United States. The President's reply 
was that "if we can prevent making them (the refugees) take those 
two sea voyages by putting some of them in some other place, well, 
they won't have to take the sea voyage. That is common sense...v®
In other words, the President seemed to have been more concerned 
with waking the refugees go back and forth than letting titan stay 
in this country away from the persecution they would have to endure 
in Europe. Edward N. Saveth, in his article "Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and the Jewish Crisis: 1933*194?' attempts to argue that the Pres­
ident was a great humanitarian and fought the Nazi persecution 
throughout its twelve-year duration with his strong statements 
against Nazi atrocities. It seems, however, that Roosevelt's human­
itarian statements were merely words which did nothing to prevent 
wh# wns taking place in Europe. Serneth refers to Roosevelt's
initiative in establishing the Evian Conference, Intergover cental 
Committee and Bermuda Conference, it does not sees* to natter to 
Saveth that these conferences and the Coaaittee did virtually 
nothing* Instead, he excuses Roosevelt by stating that, "if these 
and other aeasures sere not as effective as sons had hoped in all­
eviating the plight of those whoa the Nazis sought to destroy, it 
vas not because the Adainistration was wanting, but because of 
the savage and lnhuaan character of the advereary."^
Saveth also congratulates the President on hie strong state- 
aents in regard to such things as guilt for conaitting the atrocities 
"It is our intention that just and sure puniabsent shall be aeted 
out to the ringleaders responsible for the organized murder ol 
thousands of innocent persons and the coaaisslon of atrocities 
which have violated every tenet of tho Christian faith."®® She 
President made this statement in October, 19A2. It is a known 
fast that after this tine the Geraans speeded up their extermin­
ation prograa. Roosevelt's words were wasted breath. Instead, 
concrete action was needed to reaove the people froa Europe.
President Roosevelt's ideas about resettlement seeaed to have 
a strange undertone of "the farther away froa hoae the settlement 
is, the better it will be". Many areas of the world were consid­
ered for resettleaent and it seeaed that
"the Adainictration pressed ahead with a plan to sake 
Angola or perhaps Rhodesia into a refugee republic.
America's own experience as a successful resettle­
aent operation was too strong to overcome. While 
Roosevelt was focusing on Africa as the aost likely^ace where new 'huddled aaases' could be settled, itehall (of Great Britain) had shown increasing 
interest is British Guiana in the American sphere.
Neither side seemed particularly enthusiastic About
coroutine its own sphsrs to resettlement* Roosevelt* s 
enthusiaslm showed a suspicious increase the further 
such resettlement schemes were away from home. When 
Harold Iekes pushed for resettlement..*in the Virgin fl. 
Islands the idea was rejected by the administration*"01
The Administration only approved one plan to allow refugee 
settlement here. That came late in the war and allowed for only 
a relatively small group of refugees to enter. President Roosevelt 
stated on June 9, 19Mf• that it was "important that the United 
States indicate that it is ready to share the burden of caring 
for refugees during the war. Accordingly, I have decided that 
approximately 1000 refugees should be placed in an Emergency 
Refugee Shelter to be established at Fort Ontario near Oswego,
New fork, where under appropriate security restrictions they will 
remain for the duration of the war. The President stated that 
the refugees will be brought into this country outside the regular 
immigration procedure."®* The President spoke of this action as 
if it were a great humanitarian act. A humanitarian act it was, 
however, the gesture was an extremely latecoming apology for years 
of insensitivity* Furthermore, less than one thousand people was 
certainly a "toker shipment" as the pamphlet describing the event, 
printed by the War Relocation Authority is fittingly titled, it 
appears that Roosevelt felt that this act was a demonstration of 
our government's and his administration's real concern for the 
safety and well-being of these people. However, if the Administra­
tion's real concern had been there, where were they when the j&x 
Louis carrying over 900 passengers was drifting off of the coast 
of Miami. Surely, if these people could be brought into New York 
State outside regular immigration procedure, then the passengers 
of the fifctJiiflMiLR could have been brought in also. Roosevelt
obviously felt that allowing the refugees Into thlB country In 
would give the appearance that the United States was doing 
Its part.
The question a* to why Roosevelt behaved the way he did 
during the refugee crisis has perplexed sany scholars for years. 
Different theories have been advocated to explain this behafiOf*
A popular explanation for this Is that the State Department cont­
inually aade the refugee situation appear to Roosevelt as better 
than It actually was. This theory clsins that even Eleanor 
Roosevelt could not get thmagh to her husband because the State 
Department always wads sere to get there first. When this was 
finally uncovered to Roosevelt In late 19<t3» he began to take 
action such as creating the War Refugee Board, This seens to be 
an unlikely situation. Although the Stata Department did do nnsh 
to interfere in the rescue of the refugees, Roosevelt could have 
sade it his business to find out all of the fasts. The facts ware
not hidden. Most people knew that the situation in Europe for 
the refugees was serious. This could be ascertained just be read­
ing the major newspapers.
Henry Feingold, who seens to devote such tins to finding out
why Roosevelt was so ineffective has s theory whieh sows to make
nor# sense, Fslngold asserts that,
"once it is understood that rescue required a 
coned.taent and n price which Roosevelt was 
unwilling or unable to asks, the puzzling 
activities of the Adnlnlstrstion become nore 
comprehensible. Roosevelt and nsny in the 
Administration wanted to rescue Jews - if only 
the price weren't so high and the possibility 
so renote. In the absence of active measures, 
humanitarian rhetoric was substituted for action.
Virtually every action taken before the establish-
Bent of the 7/ar Refugee Board; the Evian and 
Bermuda Conferences, the search for resettle­
ment areas, the liberalization of the visa 
procedures, and even the establishaent of a 
temporary refugee haven in Oswego in August,
19M*, should be viewed as humanitarian gestures 
without serious intention of carrying it 
through...Roosevelt was using the State Depart*
Bent as a foil. It was one of the few instan- 
ces in which Roosevelt found some use for the 
Department. Roosevelt, in fact, was fully 
briefed on the rescue issue and knew entirely what was happening."63
In closing the discussion of Franklin D. Roosevelt there 
are two aore points which should be aade.
The first is that Franklin D. Roosevelt had the power to 
prevent soae of the atrocities in Europe. Not only could he 
have done this, but, he could have done so without any inter­
ference froa the State Department. As Saul Friedman states, 
"F.D.R. could have warned the Nazis that unless the gassing of 
Jews stopped, tue Allies would retaliate against the civilian 
populace of Qeraany with poison gas."®^ But, moreover, Roose­
velt could have done soaething even aore humane and functional 
than that. Frlednan continues,
"the President ;ould have ordered the boabard- 
aent of the
selves. _ ___ . ___ __
Allied High Coaaand early in 1$$4 by Chela 
Weizaann of the Jewish Agency, it also had 
the approval of Roswell McClelland in Switzer­
land and John Pehle in Washington. Since May, 
1943» when the Warsaw Ohetto was in its death 
throes, Russian boabers were striking at Warsaw, 
Malkin, Brest and Lublin in nighttime raids. At 
the saae tine American boabers based in North 
Africa were passing daily over the very rail­
road lines leading froa South Central Europe 
to the caaps in the north. The American 
planes cans to attack the Ploeati oil fields 
in Rumania, and then they continued on to 
Russian airfields, where they took on addition-
or against
al bombs for the return flight. In this circuit, 
the prime targets were the oilfields; but in 
operational scratches, sometimes resulting from 
poor visibility, the aviators were permitted to 
dump their bombloads on targets of opportunity, 
with first preference going to the railroad 
lines. Despite this policy, the tracks from 
Hungary to Rumania to Poland's death camps 
remained relatively unscathed and their traffic 
in human lives uninterrvpted."o5
The second point is that the era of World War II did demon­
strate one important thing about Franklin Roosevelt. He was am 
astute politician. He managed to come out looking good after 
all of this. He memorized all factions of society and all 
political colleagues into believing that he was doing all he could 
Whether that be for the pro-refugee groups or the restrictionists.
2. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Many of the problems involved with refugee Immigration 
have been blamed on the State Department, and rightly so. Op 
until early 1944, the Department continued to obstruct refugee 
immigration, particularly Jewish immigration, to the fullest 
extent possible. Breckinridge Long was appointed to the position 
of Assistant Secretary of State in January, 1940. From that 
time until December, 1944 when he left that position, he heavily 
influenced the policy of the State Department. Long has been 
credited as being the greatest source of obstructionism and the 
man most responsible for the Department's behavior toward refugees. 
In late 1943, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, 
caught on to Long and State's refugee tactics. Through evidence 
of obstruction which Morgenthau was able to uncover, he persuaded 
President Roosevelt to take the question of refugee immigration 
out of the State Department's hands. In early 1944, Roosevelt 
announced the formation of the War Refugee Board and immigration 
of refugees from Europe to the United states increase 1 dramatic­
ally. A question which has been discussed at length since the 
formation of the War Refugee Board is whether or not many more 
could have been saved had the problem been taken out of the State 
Department's hands earlier. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., insists that 
the answer is yes.
The State Department used varying tactics to cut back on 
refugee immigration. For example, State went so far as to "accuse 
the refugees of being Nazi and Communist agents."®^ Further­
more, State succeeded in convincing Roosevelt that this problem
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of spies a real threat. Because of this,
"in June. 1940, the President signed the alien 
Registration Act which required all aliens 
over 14 to be registered and fingerprinted.
And a 'special care' circular was issued by 
the State Department advising all consular 
and diplomatic officers to reevaluate all 
visas and extirpate the so-called subversive 
elements. No visa whatsoever was to be 
t .?sued if there was 'any doubt concerning the 
alien'. The best interests of the United 
States had to be considered even if it meant 
a 'drastic reduction' of quotas. The rein­
forced controls may have kept some spies out 
of the country, but it enabled unsympathetic 
consuls to reject Jews who held legitimate 
visas and tickets".87
This mandate, to check all visas carefully, was blown out of 
proportion by many consuls. Some of them simply refused visas 
because they didn't feel like issuing them, never mind that the 
person's life may have been at stake. In 1940 and 1941, V&rlan 
Fry, a reporter for The Nation made a tour of American consulates 
in Lisbon, Marseilles, Nice, Vichy and Madrid. In an article 
entitled '‘Our Consuls at Work" Fry describes some of the events 
that transpired when people attempted to get visas to the United 
States. What follows is a brief sampling.
"Lisbon, August 1940..•• The vice-consul in 
charge of visas had his own ideas about who 
should be admitted to the United States and who 
should not. I showed him my list. One of the 
first names on it was Lion Feuchtwanger. 'If 
that man should come to me and ask for a visa,' 
the vice-consul said, 'I'd refuse it. He put on 
a regular song and dance about the Soviet Union 
a few years ago...We don't want this kind in the 
United States.
Unfortunately, this was not an isolated case.
"Nice, December 1940. The young vice-consul 
in charge of visas here is fond of trick questions.
A few weeks ago he put this one to a German Jew 
from the camp of Gurs: 'What would you do if you
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vere admitted to the United States and someone 
asked you to do something against the interests 
of the Italian or German government?'
The man from Ours thought a moment. ' I 
would do what was in the interests of the 
United States,' he said. 'Visa refused,' the 
vice-consul snapped. 'We don't want anyone 
in the United States who is going to mix up 
in politics.'
Bewildered and heartbroken, the man went 
back to Gurs. He is still there, wondering 
why his answer was wrong."89
The Department came under fire from many different sources 
including the media. In response to this, the Department released 
a statement "designed to silence the mounting protest against 
its handling of the emergency refugee problem...The statement 
painted a picture of effficient and sympathetic yet careful 
procedure, operating smoothly to rescue the deserving ana week out 
the dangerous."9° Freda Kirchwey, editor of The Nation lashed 
back at State with an editorial claiming that the Department 
practically lied in its statement and that, in fact, it appeared 
as though the Department was going out of Us way to prevent refugees 
from coming into this country. "The department does not refuse 
visas. It merely sets up a line of obstacles stretching from 
Washington to Lisbon and on around to Shanghai. These ordinarily 
do the trick, and in the process wear down resistance where an 
out-and-out refusal would produce noisy protest."^1
Most of the criticism of the State Department came during 
the years 1942-1944. There is good reason for this, as Henry 
Korgenthau, Jr.f Former Secretary of the Treasury stated, "America 
has no cause to be proud of its handling of the refugee problem.
We knew in Washington, from August, 1942, on, that the Nazis were 
planning to exterminate all the Jews of Europe. Tet, for nearly
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eighteen months after the first reports of the Nani horror 
plan, the State Department did practically nothing.
Just ho? the officials in Washington found this out is a 
story in itself. For it was this information that led to the 
removal of the refugee problem from the State Department to the 
•Jar Refugee Board.
"On August 1, 1942, history thrust a terrible 
burden upon Gerhart Reigner, the representative 
in Switzerland of the World Jewish Congress.
On that day Reigner, who had himself fled 
from Nazi Germany, learned from a leading 
German industrialist that many months Before,
Hitler had ordered the extermination of all 
the Jews in Europe. The information, reloyod 
in Lausanne at the risk of the German's life, 
even specified the instrument of murder - 
prussic acid, the lethal ingredient of Zyklon 
B gas."93
"Reigner, like the governments of the 
United States and Great Britain, had been receiving 
a constant flow of information about the 
deportation of Jewish men. women and children 
to Poland. He knew, and they knew, about 
the mass executions of Jewish nationals in 
Poland and Russia.... But for all their aware­
ness of the enormity of Nazi barbarism... 
neither the United states nor Great Britain 
had any knowledge in August. 19<t2 of a 
specific order for the total extermination 
of the Jews...."9h
"Reigner realized that if the information he had received 
could be authenticated and transmitted to the United States and 
Britain, as well as to his colleagues of the World Jewish Congress, 
it might set programs of rescue in motion."^
Unfortunately, Reigner was not aware of the feelings of 
those in the State Department. He did not know that Breckinridge 
Long would not get to work immediately on the problem.
"Through private channels, Reigner got his 
ghastly story to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. Wise then
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asked the State Departnent to confira the 
information, and at ths Department's request 
he kept the story to himself. While Washington 
cabled an inquiry to the American Minister at 
Bern. Leland Harrison. In November, 1942,
Harrison sent back full documentation for 
Signer's report, which state then told Wise 
he could make public. The United States 
officially denounced the Nasi policy of 
extermination on December 17, 1942, and 
Roosevelt declared that it would be American Q(- 
policy to punish racial and political murder."*®
"On January 21, 1943, another Reigner cable arrived from 
Harrison in Switserland. Its contents were stark and terrify­
ing. It reported that Germans were killing Jews in Poland at 
the rate of 6,000 a day, that Jews in Germany were being depriv­
ed of food and ration cards, that Jews in Rumania were starving 
to death. Sumner Welles passed the cable on to Dr. Wise. Plans 
were immediately made for mass protests.... For weeks the State 
Department was bombarded with demands for action...."^'
The State Department did nothing in regard to this matter 
except make up excuses. As Morgenthau continues, "the State 
Department's reaction...took the form of trying to shut off the 
pressure by shutting off at the source the flow of Information 
which nourished it."^®
In order to shut off the source of information, the State 
Department sent a cable back the effect of which was "to order 
Harrison not to send back any more of Reigner's information.... 
Tet its language was such that a busy official...would clear it 
as a piece of administrative routine.... The cable was signed 
by Sumner Welles for Cordell Hull, but...Welles record suggests 
that he knew nothing about this cable.
Two months later, in April, Welles not knowing about the
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suppression cable, asked for more Information. "Harrison 
replied that he was sending the text of another report from
Rcigner.... He added that such reports should not be subject
100to the restrictions imposed by the suppression cable."
The Treasury found out about the cable through its Foreign 
Funds Control Division which was "supposed to receive copies 
of cables bearing upon the refugee question". ^  They had 
heard about Harrison's remark and asked for a copy of the supp­
ression cable which the State Department refused to hand over.
"In March, 19*t3, the World Jewish Congress cabled Y/ashington
that there was a real chance of rescuing 70,000 Jews from France
102and Rumania provided funds could be got into Switzerland."
The State Department did not want to pursue the matter. The Treasury 
Department had thought out a plan to get the money into Switzer­
land without the Germans being able to get at it. However, "within 
the State Department... Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long... 
was opposed or dubious (about the plan) to the point of indiffer- * 
ence." Much time was spent trying to get the program underway. 
Morgenthau asserted that there had been "no failure to establish 
safe mechanisms for exchange. Rather, officers of the State Depart­
ment and representatives of Great Britain had held up the program." 
British policy made the taak difficult because they, like some 
in State* felt that this monetary exchange would be detrimental to 
the policy of economic warfare against Germany. Morgenthau realized 
now that the only way to finish the deal was to have Cordell Hull, 
Secretary of State, handle it. Hull attemptod to handle the British 
Foreign Office. However, they continued to stall the project as 
much as they could. Eventually, the plan fizzled out and the Jews
of Hungary were not saved.
However, before this happened Morgenthau, extremely upset 
by the actions of the State Department went to see Roosevelt 
himself. "On January 16, 19Mt» Morgenthau told the President 
that he was deeply disturbed by the conditions in the State 
Department. The Treasury, he said, had uncovered evidence 
indicating that subordinates there defying Hull, were not only 
inefficient in dealing with the refugee problem, but were actually 
taking steps to prevent the rescue of the Jews."1®*
The President told Morgenthau to speak about the situation 
with Under-Secretary of State Stettinius. It was apparent that 
Roosevelt did not fully buy the statements about Long* s inter­
ference. Morgenthau told Stettinius that "'he was convinced that 
people in the State Department, particularly Breckinridge Long, 
were deliberately obstructing the execution of any plan to save 
the Jews and that forthright, immediate action was necessary if 
this Government was not going to be placed in the same position 
as Hitler and share the responsibility for exterminating all the 
Jews of Europe.'"10^
Stettinius stated that he was "not surprised about Breckinridge 
Long since Long had fallen just as badly and in an equally shock­
ing way in the handling of the exchange of prisoners. Stettinius 
pointed cut that...in the reorganisation of the State Department, 
which he had worked out, the only remaining function assigned to 
Breckinridge Long was Congressional Relations".1®?
At Morgenthau's previous meeting with Roose/elt, Roosevelt 
had discussed a draft of an executive order with Morgenthau and 
John Pehle establishing a war refugee board. The plan called for
the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War and Secretary 
of State to operate the board. Stettinlua examined the draft 
of the order and gave it his full endorsement. This satisfied 
F.D.S. who, "on January 22, 19H, established the War Refugee
Board to assist the immediate rescue and relief of the Jews of
108Europe..." Finally, something concrete was implemented to 
aid the people of Europe.
As stated previously, much of the policy of the State Depart­
ment was formulated by Breckinridge Long. Long has been charged 
with being unsympathetic to ; e refugee problem. Long was convin­
ced that he had done all he could to solve the problem even after 
the evidence against him was out. As is demonstrated by his 
diary entry of January 2A, 19Mf:
"The President has appointed a Refugee 
Board consisting of the Secretaries of State 
War, and Treasury.... What they can do that 
have not done, I cannot imagine.... However,
I think it is a good move for local political 
reasons. For there are If million Jews in New 
York and its environs who feel themselves 
related to the refugees and because of the 
persecutions of the Jews, and who have been 
demanding special attention and treatment (sic).
This will encourage them to think the persec­
uted may be saved and possibly satisfy them - 
politically - but in my opinion the Board will 
not save any persecuted people I could not
Not only did Long believe everything possible had been done, but 
his opinions also seemed to have an anti-semetic flavor to them. 
Henry Feir.gold asserts that Long was "utterly devoted to foiling 
the rescue effort and was everywhere successful until Morgec.thau 
was activated as a countervailing force within the administration 
•••• Roosevelt felt his hands were tied by the continued strength 
of the restrlctionists, and in case he forgot, Long was always 
there to remind him.... Much of the initiative for the alien reg­
istration and other security lavs emanated from Long."
Feingold also states that "Long was sick - sick with ambition, 
sick with anti-Semitism. He viewed his fight against the 
refugees as primarily a battle against Jewish Communist agita­
tors v/ho were trying to ruin his political career. . . . " 1 ' 1
It should now be obvious that a major part of the problems 
faced by refugees trying to get to the United States were caused 
by the State Department and Brockinridge Long. Had it not been 
for the interference of Henry Morgunthau, Jr., several thousand 
more may have been murdered.
Before discussing the War Refugee Board it is important to 
briefly discuss the Bermuda Conference of 19*t3.
The reports of atrocitiec in Germany "helped embarass the 
Allies into taking what appeared to be more positive action....
The attempt to dispel the impression of callous indifference to 
human suffering manifested itself in another sham conference.... 
Ostensibly called to help refugees, like so many previous meetings 
the Anglo-American Bermuda Conference of April, I9*f3» turned out
l i p
to be a conference of words without action."
The idea of a conference was that of the British and the 
Americans and it was called in response to a massive public outcry 
to aid the refugees of Europe. "Rabbi Stephen S. Wise organised 
the 'Stop Hitler Now' rally on March 1. Police estimated that 
seventy-five thousand pezsons attempted to enter the Garden 
which seated twenty-one thousand."11-*
But why was there a seemingly quick turn-around in world 
public opinion. Demonstrations were taking place everywhere, not
only In the United States. "By the end of 19W, the world knew 
that Hitlar's shrill railings against the Jews were no longer 
vain threats. At first) the reaction was one of sorrow and 
pity.... It did not take long, however, before the shock of this 
news was transformed into anger, and pressure mounted from all 
sides to rescue the remnants of European Jewry."
Prior to the Conference, the State Department drew up a 
memorandum for the American delegation to the conference. This 
memorandum instructed the Americans,
"not to limit the discussion to Jewish 
Refugees; not to raise questions of religious 
faith or race in appealing for public support 
or promising U.S. funds; not to make commitments 
regarding shipping space for refugees; not to 
expect naval escorts or safe-conducts for refug­
ees; not to delay the wartime shipping program 
by suggesting that homeward-bound empty trans­
ports pick-up refugees en route; not to bring 
refugees across the ocean if any space for 
their settlement was available in Europe; not 
to pledge funds, since that was the prerogative 
of Congress, and the President; not to expect 
any changes in the U.S. immigration laws; not 
to ignore the needs either of the war effort 
or of the American civilian population for 
food and money and not to establish new agencies 
for the relief of refugees, since the Intcrgovern- ... 
mental Committee already existed for that purpose."11^
It is important to note that both this memorandum and the confer­
ence took place before the refugee problem was taken away from the 
State Department. Therefore, the incident is typical of State's 
behavior at that time.
Unfortunately, both the British and American Governments 
decided before the Conference that it would be extremely private. 
Only government personnel "and one representative of one Jewish
116group, O.R.T. President George Backer" was permitted to attend. w
Also in attendance were four members .f international press assoc- 
iatons. The fate of the Conference was sealed even before it got 
under way. Furthermore, the Conference did not solve any of the 
problems of the refugees. Throughout it, "the press was kept 
uninformea about the actual course of the negotiations. However, 
throughout the ton days of the conference they were titillated 
with the prospect that Palestine, North Africa, Madagascar, Maur­
itius, French Equatorial Africa, the Diredawa section of Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Mogador, Argentina, Mexico, Jamaica, or the Isle of Man 
might serve as a haven for refugees. These reports were dutifully 
transmitted to the United States and Great Britain."11^ The idea 
behind transmitting the reports was to show the people of those 
countries that action was being taken. However, this did not 
work. "Major publications including the New York Times. Washington 
Post. Tho Times (London) and the Daily Worker lashed out against
i i a
the conference."
The subject of America's immigration policies was a stickler 
at the conference. Especially in light of the fact that "in 1943, 
immigration to the United States totalled 23,725, the lowest figure 
in 110 years except for 1933. In 1943 alone, 130,000 legal entry 
certificates went unused. While thousand of Jews were gassed daily 
in Europe, only 4,705 Jews entered the United States that year."11^ 
This was the result of the fact that unused quotas of other countries 
were not permitted to be used for the people from countries that 
needed them the most. This topic was never discussed at the Conf­
erence because as Harold Willis Dodds, Chief of the American Deleg­
ation stated, "we got direct word from the White House that we
1 20could not discuss increasing the quotas with the British."
The British stuck to the terns of the White Paper with regard
to immigration to Palestine. The White Paper of 1939 had limited 
total Jewish immigration to Palestine at 75,000. a discussion 
of the revival of the Intergovernmental Committee came up although 
by the end of the war the I.G.C.R. had still accomplished next to 
nothing. What was the outcome of the Bermuda Conference? "At 
the conclusion of the Conference, the participants had 'explored' 
sufficiently to state that there was 'no immediate prospect of 
escape for the potential refugees in the grip of the Axis. ' " 121
3. THE WAS REFUGEE BOARD
As discussed earlier, on January 22, Franklin D.
Roosevelt announced the formation of the War Refugee Board*
According to the President, the Board "was charged with the respon­
sibility of taking all action consistent with successful prosecu­
tion of the war to rescuethe*victims of enemy oppression in imminent 
danger of death and to afford such victims all other possible relief 
and assistance."1^
The creation of this Board was the first concrete step taken 
by the Government of the United States in aiding the refugees 
since the beginning of the crisis in 1933* As Arthur D. Morse 
states,
"three days after the creation of the Board... 
a cable drafted by John Pehle was sent over the 
signature of Cordell Hull to all United States 
embassies, consulates and other diplomatic 
missions. It ordered that 'action be taken to 
forestall the plot of the Nazis to exterminate 
the Jews and other persecuted minorities in 
Europe'.... The practice of suppressing un­
pleasant information had ended. The message 
specified that 'communication facilities should 
be made freely available to...private agencies 
for all appropriate messages for carrying out 
the policy of this government.'"123
"John Pehle, Jr., the...Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
was made temporary director.... Within a few weeks it became app­
arent to all that he had taken a strong hold of the director's 
job...and he became permanent director."
"The actual operation of the W.R.B. was kept deliberately 
small and flexible. The staff never exceeded thirty-five people, 
among whom specialists in refugee and rescue affairs figured prom­
inently.... In all cases except one, Carlton Hayes, the American
#
Ambassador to Spain, W.R.B. agents could depend on close support 
from the diplomatic missions. This was especially true in Turkey,
itf.
125Sweden an- Switzerland." '
Initially it seemed that funding of the Board would be
a problem because in an oversight, funding had not been planned
for in the executive order. However, this uiu not turn out
to be a problem because "Roosevelt granted the agency 31,000,000
from his emergency fund.... Thereafter? the Board was to be
financed by the private rescue agencies, primarily the American
Jewish Joint Distribution. remittee. In May, the V/.R.B.
received an additional i , 0.,000 which it had to share with
the I.Q.C.R. However, this proved to be more than enough because
when the agency ceased operations in 1945* it was able to givo
1 26some of this money back."
The actions of the Jar Refugee Boar- wore highly effective 
and it is unfortunate that the Board or some other bouy like it 
was not established much earlier.
Unfortunately, as with every other organization, not every­
thing is a success. This was the case when the Boar;, attempts- 
to save the 1,000,000 Jews of xiungary in 19Mi. The operation 
began in late May when Joel Brand, arrived "in Istanbul... 
documented as a representative of the Jewish Community of Budapest 
and submitted a proposal to the Jewish Agency. This proposal 
state:, that Eichmann would agree to stop the deportation and 
extermination of Jews in all areas which the Germans occupy if 
Brand delivered a large amount of various good,"12? Unfortunately, 
as Bran- attempted to travel to Syria to further discuss the pro­
posal, the British arrested him there. Ira Hirschmann, of the 
V.’ar Refugee Board was sent to investigate the Brand situation. 
"Hirschmann caught up with Brand and his captors in Cairo....
Hirschmann persuaded the British to release Brand and then*** 
recommended that he be sent back to Hungary."'^® In the mean* 
time the Soviet Union vetoed the United States decision to use 
Brand as a stalling agent and further the negotiations. There­
fore, the United States called off the plan.
The Y/ar Refugee Board also attempted to persuade the War 
Department into bombing the railway lines to Auschwitz in order 
to stop the deportations. Assistant Secretary of War John McQoy 
replied thar "the War Department is of the opinion that the sug­
gested air operation is impracticable. It could be executed only 
by the diversion of considerable air support essential to the 
success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations and would 
in any case be of such very doubtful efficacy that it would not 
amount to a practical project."
These were two instances when the War Refugee Board would 
have been able to act, unfortunately its hanus were tied. No 
one intervened to permit the Board to act. Although the Board 
did many things in Europe v/ithout going through the normal 
diplomatic ties, this was one instance in which the Board could 
not act independently.
However, the Board did have many successes. Before discus­
sing these, it is important to note that the Board had a change 
of leadership about one year after its formation. "The War Refugee 
Board announced... on January 28, 191*5...that John W. Pehle had 
resigned as Executive Director of the Board.... Mr. Pehle resignci 
because of new duties which have been assigned to him as Assistant
to the Secretary of the Treasury.... At the same time, the Board 
announced the selection of Brigadier-General William O'Dwyer as 
the new Executive Director. . . . " 1 0^
On September 15, 1945, General O'Dwyer submitted his final 
summary report of the activities of the War Refugee Board. In 
it, he discussed the successes and the failures of the organization 
The successes were important and with the exception of Hungary, 
which the Board could not control, they outnumbered the failures.
There is a post-script to the story of Jews in Hungary 
which demonstrates that t ie operation there was not a total failure
"Raoul Wallenberg, a young Swedish business­
man, volunteered to proceed to Hungary for the Board 
to aid in the rescue and relief.... The Swedish 
Government granted him diplomatic status and station­
ed him in Budapest for the purpose of rendering 
protection to these people. The Board furnished 
Wallenberg detailed plane of action, but made it 
clear that he could not act in Hungary as a rep­
resentative of the Board. Wallenberg, supplied 
with funds from the Board and the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee, carried on a relent­
less campaign in Hungary in behalf of the Jews.
He issued protective passports by the thousands 
and hired extra buildings as official Swedish 
quarters to house several hundred Rabbis and com­
munal leaders under the protection of the extra­
territoriality which attache^ to such buildings.
He constantly pressed the Hungarian authorities 
for better treatment of Jews and succeeded in 
having thousands brought bade to Budapest from 
the forced labor marches. In all, approximately 
20,000 Jews received the safety of Swedish pro­
tection in Hungary. " 1 1
Unfortunately, Wallenberg was reported missing on April 
4, 194?* He was reported dead in June, 1945* However, it is 
believed that Wallenberg may have been captured by the Russians 
and may be imprisoned in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Govern­
ment refuses to discuss the case.
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The Board had made other successful attempts to save 
refugees. It "succeeded in developing a sporadic flow of refugees 
through Turkey. Approximately 7,000 persons were brought out by 
boat across the Black Sea from Rumania or by rail through Bulgaria 
then across: Turkoy into Palestine. " 1 2^
"1392 refugees were brought out of Rumania by sea which was 
supplemented by rail evacuation through Bulgaria to Turkey. These 
people were brought to final safety In Palestine."1”
"539 refugees were able to escape from Greece by means of 
small fishing craft and other vessels plying the Aegean Sea to the 
Turkish coast, betv/een January 1944 and February 1945* They were 
all sent on to Pa" 'Stine."^
Although the preceding rescues were of relatively small groups, 
one of the largest successful rescue efforts took place In Rumania.
"Approximately 130.000 Jews had been 
deported in October 194* from Bessarabia ana 
Bucovina to Transnlstrla, a German-controlled 
area botween the Dniester and Bug rivers. They 
were houseu In deplorable camps in a territory 
virtually destroyed In the course of the German- 
Russlan fighting. Epidemics broke out and thous­
ands died. At the time of the Board's creation, 
reports were received that some 30,000 Jews still 
alive in Transnlstrla were In the direct line of 
the retreating German armies. Despite the fact 
that the United States and Rumania were at war, 
the Board's representative In Ankara, was able 
to arrange for the Rumanian Government to 
transfer these people from Transnlstrla to Rumania 
and later facilitate their emigration from 
Rumania. Rumania finally agreed, and late in 
March. 1944, 48,000 Jews were moved from Trans- 
nistria to Rumania. Many of thorn, mostly 
children, were transformed with other refugees 
from Rumania to Palestine."135
Although the War Refugee Board's good acts cannot be 
accepted as an apology for our government's blatant insensitiv­
ity in the previous years, it should be applauded for what it was 
Able to accomplish. It is unfortunate that it was not put to ;
work much earlier
C. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES
Public opinion toward the displaced persons or refugees 
was not favorable in the period 1939—1914.5, at least as far as 
immigration was concerned* Throughout this period restrictionist 
groups obviously held the strongest and the most-voiced opinions 
on the subject. For this reason, it was not difficult for the 
government to keep out as many refugees as it could. Although 
there were many voices for increased immigration, they could not 
be heard above those of the restrlctionists. This appears to 
be an interesting phenomenon, especially when one considers 
that this country is a nation of immigrants. If the restriction- 
ists were not immigrants themselves, then their parents or grand­
parents certainly were.
There is another Interesting aspect of the public opinion 
question. About 19Mt» public sentiment seemed to turn around 
so that it was in favor of helping the refugees anu persecuted 
people of Europe. However, public opinion still aia not favor 
increased immigration to the United States.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to analyze public opinion 
in this era by using the statistics of public opinion polls.
Very few national polls were taken at this time. No Callup 
Polls were recorded on the •public's opinion toward immigration 
in the Gallup Poll Reports of that period, although there is 
some information in another report. The only two questions that 
that poll asked on American's opinions toward immigration were 
taken in 1946 and 1955.^  The few polls dealing with refugee
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immigration and kindred subjects were taken by Magazine*^™
In "July, 1938, Fortune asked, 'What is your attitude toward 
allowing Qerman,. Austrian, and other political refugees to come 
into the United States?' The responses were as follows; k , 9 %
' felt that we should encourage them to come even if we have to 
raise our immigration quotas' * 18.2% 'felt that we should allow
them to come but not raise the immigration quotas'. 9.5% 'stated 
that they didn't know'. However, an overwhelming 67.h% felt that 
'with conditions as they are, we should try to keep them out'."1^® 
Nearly one year later, in April, 1939# asked the
following question; "'If you were a member of Congress, woulu 
you vote yes or no on a bill to open the doors of the United 
States to a larger number of European refugees than now are admit­
ted under our immigration quotas?' Unfortunately, did mot
calculate results by the overall group of people asked. Instead 
they are broken down into relgious groups. Of the Jewish people 
eksod, '69*9% said yes, 25.8% said no, and h«h% did not know'.
Of the Catholics, '8.3% said yes, 8h.0% sala no, ana 7.7% dia 
not know'. Finally, of the Protestants, '6.3% saia yes, 85.3% 
said no, and 8.h% didn't know'."1*^
In 19h5, Free World polled Americans and asked; "Here is a 
list of different groups of people. Do you think we should let 
a certain number of each of these groups come to the United States 
to live after the war, or do you think we should stop some of the 
groups from coming at all."1**® The list included Germans, Japan­
ese, Jews, Swedes, English, Mexicans, Chinese and Hussians. How- 
eve$ we will only discuss those groups pertinent to this topic.
"36% of those asked favored letting in Germans; 59% said no to 
letting them in and 5% said they didn't know. In regard to Jews;
kS% M i d  yes; lf6% said no and 8% had no opinion. 62% said yes 
to Swedes; 27% eol-d no, and 11% had no opinion. 68% said yes to 
English; 26% said no, and ?% did not know. Finally, 57% agreed 
to admitting Russians; 33% said no, 10% aid not know". ^
These results are quite interesting when one realizes that 
the public knew about the sufferings of the Jews, yet they were 
split as to whether or not they should be let in. On the other 
hand, 68% wanted to admit the English who had suffered the least 
of any of the aforementioned groups during the war. Not only 
that, but when one looks at the statistics of Germans and Jews, 
there is only a difference of 10% with regara to admission of 
the two groups. As far as this is concerned only 10% mors felt 
that Jews should be let in than felt that Germans should. This 
is quite interesting considering the fact that the Jews were 
the oppressed and the Germans the oppressors. Furthermore, the 
Germans had plunged the world into war and brought suffering onto 
the entire world.
Fres Jorlu stated that "in general, 25% of Americans seem 
to be opposed to any kind of immigration whatsoever. Accordingly 
when...if6% are opposed to Jewish immigration, these figures repres­
ent 21% over the average minimum of those opposed to all immigra­
tion. This difference could be regarded as the margin of special 
prejudices against certain foreign groups...."11** According 
to this reasoning there was less "special prejudice" against 
Germans than Jews.
In the early post-war years immigration of refugees was still 
not favored by ths American public. This sentiment may be partly 
attributed to the fact that the public believed that most of the 
refugees or displaced persons were Jewish. Although this was true
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throughout the pre-war and war years, the percentages changed 
after the war simply because of the fact that most of the Jewish 
p eop le in Europe had been killed by 191+5.
although many Americans seemed to favor admission of other 
groups in the war years, their sentiments changea when that meant 
putting up people in their homes or Using American passenger 
ships to transport them. It seems that once the question involv­
ed some type of sacrifice, either personal or on a national 
level, the attitudes changed.
In 191+0, the American Institute for Public Opinion asked 
Americans several questions about certain groups of refugees.
"on June 26, a .I.P.O. asked 'should the U.S. permit English 
and French women and children to come to this country and stay 
until the war is over?' The responses were 38$ yes, i+2% no. 
However, when this same question was asked with the addition 
of 'would you be willing to take one or more of these children 
into your home until the war is over', the responses changed 
dramatically. 25$ said yes, said no and 21$ were undecided." 
In August of l9<+0, A.I.P.O. asked if people "would approve of 
sending American passenger ships to England to bring back English 
refugee //omen and children. 1+5$ approved; 53$ disapproved." ^
It is obvious that Americans were unwilling to make personal 
sacrifices, However, the question of whether or not we should 
send 3ur ships there most likely had a lot to do with safety. When 
A.I.P.o. asked if Americans would approve of using these ships 
if Germany and Itally agreed not to attack them, "63$ approved;
37$ disapproved".1^  obviously, this early in the conflict 
Americans still had confidence in the word of Hitler* s government.
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It would take them quite a while to realize that that government
could not be trusted.
In analyzing American public opinion in this time period, 
it is a safe assumption to say that organizations had a voice 
in the refugee issue and they were able to sway the public. Hot 
only did large labor organizations, which were almost always 
restrictionist, affect public opinion, but smaller organizations 
did as well.
"Restrictionist sentiment flowed from many sources in this 
period. On the far right, neo-Nazi organizations gained in appeal 
by assaulting Jews, Bolsheviks and aliens. According to a report 
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, dated January 
3, 1939p there were 135 organizations in the United States which 
the Committee then regarded as fascist. Of these, perhaps only 
23 percent were bonafide organizations."1if® However, of these, 
some were very powerful.
"The Dies Committee reported that the 
German-Amerlcan Bund, constructed on the found­
ations of the Chicago Teutonia Society and Friends 
of the New Germany, received its inspiration, 
programs and direction from the Nazi Ministry of 
Propaganda.... The Bund claimed a dedicated 
membership of 23,000, operated twenty-four retreat 
camps across the country, distributed thousands 
of pamphlets, sponsored a daily national radio 
program, and packed Madison Square Garden for 
patriotic rallies in 1939 and 194*0. Moreover, 
through its control of the German-Amerlcan
press, estimated at better than 90 percent pro- 
Nazi by 19<fO, the Bund attempted to frustrate 
administration policies which they constx'ued as 
prejudicial to the Fatherland, including any 
proposal for the harboring of refugees from 
Germany."’h7
A group which collaborated with the Bund was William Dudley 
Pelley's Silver Shirt Legion of America. "The Silver Shirts
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clAimed a membership of 100,000 before Pelley's arrests for 
embezzlement and violation of the Espionage Act."1^®
Even more influential than the two groups mentioned above 
was Father Charles E. Coughlin of Royal Oak, Michigan* Coughlin 
"had a radio audience of 5*5 million."1^  Through this Coughlin 
preached violent anti-sealtic comments for years. Of course, 
Coughlin was a pre-war influence. He preached from 1926 to 
1938, until belatedly, the Catholic hierarchy in the 0.S. moved 
to shut him up. Nevertheless, he heavily influenced American 
ideas in the war era.
So we see that it is not only labor organizations like the 
Junior Order of American Patriotic and Fraternal Societies which 
testified against immigration at Congressional hearings which 
influenced American opinion. These other groups greatly influenced 
it as well.
Overall, the American public was not very friendly to the 
refugees or to anything related to the refugee question. Much 
of this sentiment was justified by the excuse that immigration 
fosters unemployment. However, this is obviously false* Numerous 
studies have shown that an increase in immigration actually leads 
to an Increase in the number of jobs. For example, "in Great 
Britain, according to figures presented to the House of Commons 
...by the British Homo Secretary, eleven thousand refugees have 
made jobs for fifteen-thousand native-born Englishmen".1^0 Further­
more, "it is pertinent to point out that every period in American 
history which saw a groat influx of immigrants was followed with­
in a comparatively short time by a rise in the prosperity of the 
country."1**
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However, the ideas of immigration and unemployment 
continued to be fostered by the large labor organizations 
such as the American Federation of Labor. The Federation's 
President, William Qreen, had favored passage of the Wagner- 
Rogors bill. Yet throughout the era there were numerous 
news stories discussing how the American Federation of Labor 
urged limits on immigration.
But the Federation was not the only group to call for re­
striction of immigration. Nummraa organizations, basically 
the types of organizations which considered themselves "patriot­
ic" constantly called for bans on, or decreases in, immigration.
For example, The New York Times stated in an article from
June 5> 19h1 that, "the American Legion urged Congress today
1 52to stop all immigration into the Unites States." ^  At the 
hearings on the Wagaer-Rogers bill numerous. organizations were 
present. The Allied Patriotic Societies, Incorporated stated 
that they were opposed to the bill on the grounds that it would 
"separate children from parents...raise unemployment.••and inevit­
ably lead to a further breakdown of our immigration quotas.... " * "  
Other groups with the same ideas included the Daughters of the 
American Revolution, the Young Americans, Incorporated and the 
American Coalition.1** The list is quite large. All of these 
groups fed fuel to the fire of restrictionism. That fire certainly 
gave no warmth to the thousands of displaced persons in Europe.
A pamphlet distributed by the Public Affairs Committee, 
Incorporated, summed up these groups quite well.
"This element consists of many sorts of people.
Quite a few of them are professional alien-
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haters and Jew-baiters. Sons of those 
function through organizations such as 
the American Coalition. Other organiza­
tions are largely rackets sponsored by 
individuals who exploit the fears of 
sincerely patriotic, if often ill-informed, 
citizens."'55
These groups used various tactics to get people to follow 
their beliefs. "They disseminated such fantastic rumours 
as that there are now from 5,000,000 to 20,000,000 aliens 
illegally in this country, most of them on federal relief; 
that 'foreigners' are getting control of the government in 
Washington; and that to bring in more refugees than the quotas 
allow is really part of a great and subtle plot to ruin the 
United States."1^
Unfortunately, in this period of time, it seems as though 
the citizens and government officials of this country managed 
to eat this propaganda up.
IV. THE POST-WAR YEARS: 1949-1952
The War in Europe cane to an end with the Qerman un­
conditional surrender "on May 7 , 1945 in Rheins to Eisenhower, 
anc one day later in Berlin to Zhukov, the Russian conqueror 
of Berlin."1”  "World War II left in its wake a confused and 
heterogenous mass of refugees and displaced persons. Oernany 
had been stripped of its civilian administration and the situa­
tion there was chaotic. No policy to deal with these circum­
stances had been defined at Y a l t a . " ^
"When the United Nations took over shattered and defeated 
Germany, one of the major problems was to oxtend help to the vic­
tims of Nazy tyranny. There were some 6,500,00 of them - slave 
laborers from conquered lands, political prisoners, Jews persec­
uted under the brutal 'racial laws' of the Hitler regime, all 
referred to as D.P.'a, standing for Displaced Persons." ^
"In spite of chaotic communication ana transportation 
conditions after V-E Day, over 4,000,000 of these 6,500,000 exiles 
had been moved out of Qermany by July, and the number continued 
tO’climb, By late October, about one million remained."1^® Of 
these one million, about 100,000 were Jewish.
The entire world political situation had changed. The War 
had come to an end. Twelve years of misery and suffering had come 
to an end for hundreds of thousands. Or had it?
The situation for those one million refugees left was path­
etic. These were people who could not, or for very legitimate 
reasons would not go back to where they were before the war hau 
begun. Many of them were in concentration caups, only now those
-60-
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camps were referred to aa "Displaced Persons Centers". The 
conditions in these "centers" were nearly as bad as during the 
war. As Sari 0. Harrison, who had been sent by President Truman 
to investigate the situation in Europe said, "as matters now 
stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated 
them, except that we do not exterminate them".1 '^
Harriuon kept a diary of what he saw in the camps as he 
toured them. Here is a sample of those conditions:
"Bergen-Belsen. We had been repeatedly 
told that it was useless to visit this place, 
hitherto one of the most terrible of all the 
Nazi concentration camps, because 'its all 
burned down'. Nevertheless, we found llf.000 
displaced persons there, about half of tnem 
Jews. Building No. 1, with the gas chambers 
and crematoria had been destroyed. All the 
rest of Belsen remains much as the Nazis left 
it. The buildings are substantial, but fright­
fully overcrowded. We were in one loft, 20 
by 80 feet, which housed 85 people with all of 
their belongings. Their whole lives had to be 
carried on in that partionless, dreary space....
Celle. A 'bad camp' with many Jews living 
in horse stalls, sick and well together, sue 
inmate told us: 'The hardest thing is to look 
outside the camp and see the Germans so much 
better off than we are, even the ones that 
used to be our guards and tormentors. They 
have better.food and better clothes. And they 
are free."162
These were the conditions of the D.P.'s after the War. 
Their German oppressors lived freely outside the camps while 
they continued to suffer. In the remaining portion of this 
paper, we will review what the Unit 3d States did for these 
people in the post-war per-oc.
A. UNITED STATES CONOHES.S
The Displaced Persons problem came to a head in the Congress. 
V/ith the results of the Harrison report on conditions in the "D.P. 
Centers" made public, Prerident Truman began talcing measures to 
help the D.P.'s. This action came in the form of what has come 
to be known as the "Truman Directive".
The President realized that "America's role in resettlement 
would help solve the problem both directly and Indirectly, through 
stimulating other countries to follow suit.... President Truman 
directed American Consulates abroad to give preference in the 
issuance of immigration visas wherever possible to displaced 
p e r s o n s . . . . M o r e  on Truman and his actions will be discussed 
later. However, the release of this statement and the Harrison 
report began to make the public aware of the D.P. problem.
Pressure began to mount, although slowly, to do sometning about 
the situation.
Several months after the issuance of the Truman Directive, 
it became apparent that although the intentions of the directive 
were good, the measures taken were inadequate due to the quota 
laws in effect, "in the first nine months of 194-6, only 5,000 
displaced persons entered the country under the quota system."1^* 
Aside from the fact that this dissatisfied President Truman and 
•oved him to ask Congress to admit D.P.'s outside the quota system, 
it ai uped public opinion. The result of this "was the formation 
in fall of 1946 of the Citizens Committee on Displaced Persons. 
Chairman of the Board was Earl Q. Harrison, and it included numerous 
other prominent figures".^ The Citizens Committee (CCDP) was
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to lie the "spearhead in the drive for displaced persons legis­
lation....1'166
The formation of the C.C.D.P. combined with the President's 
request to aid the D.P.'s opened up a battle in Congress over 
the subject. "In Congress, forty-nine senators and represent­
atives issued a statement pledging their support to a measure to 
open unused wartime quotas to displaced persons. Meanwhile, 
opposition quickly developed on the part of the restrlctionists. 
National Commander Paul Griffiths of the American Legion issued 
a statement warning that the entry of displaced persons would 
deprive veterans of both jobs and houses. Senator Revercomb 
stated in a report on the D.P. problem that the Truman plan 
'would of course break down the quota system and completely do 
away with the present plan of allotments by countries and the 
policy of national origins.'"1®^
The battle over displaced persons legislation had begun. It 
would be four years before it was settleu.
In both his January, 1947* State of the Union Address and 
his Special Address to Congress of July, 19*f?» President Truman 
appealed to Congress to enact legislation favorable to admis­
sion of D.P.'s. In April, of 19V?, "the first and simplest legis­
lative proposal concerning the D.P.'s was drafted by the C.C.D.P.
and introduced by Representative William Stratton, a young
1 fiARepublican Congressman from Illinois."
The act read as follows:
"SECTION 1: This Act shall be known and may 
be cited as the 'Emergency Temporary Displaced 
Persons Admission Act'.
SECTION 2: During the four fiscal years follow­
ing the passage of this Act, displaced persons apply­
ing for admission for permanent residence to the
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United States shall be admitted as non-quota 
immigrants provided that;
(a) They are qualified under all immig­
ration laws of the United States for admission 
for permanent residence.
(b) Not more than one hundred thousand of 
such displaced persons shall be aumitted under 
this Act during the first of the four fiscal 
years following the passage of this act; not 
more than two hundred thousand during the first 
two of such fiscal years; not more than three 
hundred thousand during the first three of such 
fiscal years; and not more than four hundred 
thousand in the total four fiscal year periods.
SECTION 3. Priority shall be given to the 
widow, parents, children, and other relatives 
within the fourth degree of consanguinity of 
citizens of the United States or of persons 
who served honorably in the armed services of 
the United states during iVorld War II or florid 
War I.
SECTION A* The Secretary of State and the 
Attorney Qeneral shall have authority to pre­
scribe appropriate regulations for the admin­
istration of the provisions of this Act and the 
President may utilise such agencies of the 
Government aa he deems necessary to carry out the 
purposes of this act.
SECTION 5* Ac used in this Act, the term 
'Displaced Person' means a person in Germany,
Austria, or Italy at the time of the passage 
of this Act who (1) is out of hie country of 
former residence as a result of events subseq­
uent to the outbreak of World War II; and (2) 
is unable or unwilling to return to the country 
of his nationality cr former residence because 
of persecution or his fear of persecution on .gg 
account of race, religion, or political opinions."
As we will see shortly, the bill that came out of 
Congress was not the same as the bill mentioned above.
"The testimony of the hearings revealed that two basic 
issues were in dispute - the effect of the admission of dis­
placed persons on American society and the extent to which 
the United States was obligated to help these stateless i pie."1'0 
Furthermore, although such organizations as the America . agion 
and the American Coalition "set forth their vigorous opposition
6*>
to the displaces persons program...they were greatly out-
171numbered by the sponsors of the plan." 1
The question of the effect of the D.P.'s on American Society 
vras addressed several times. Those people in favor of the bill 
answerea this question by stating that these were the strongest 
people left after the war. As Representative Stratton stated 
in his opening remarks at the hearings, "most of them (the D.P.'s)
represent a survival of the fittest, having escaped and endured
172what millions of their kinsmen could not survive." '
Even some organizations which were restrictionist through­
out the weir years, now favored this legislation, one such group 
was the American F<deration of Labor. The A.F.L. "unanimously 
recommended emergency legislation to permit the unfilled quotas 
of the war period to be utilized by entry into our country of 
those suffering displaced persons of Europe."^ The A.F.L. 
also had previously stated that it dia not want refugees taking 
jobs away from Americans. However, the A.F.L. now suddenly 
changed its tune. As William Qreen, President of the Feneration 
testified, "H.R. 2910 will not have any diverse bearing on the 
American workman. More than 50 percent of the D.P.'s are women 
and children. They will not be job competitor*. The email 
number admitted each year...cannot have any serious effect on 
our employment problem. On the contrary...they will fill some of 
our labor shortages...."
Herbert H. Lehman, representing the National Community 
Relations Advisory Council claimed that the D.P.'s could only 
benefit our country. As Lehman stated, "far from being, as the 
name 'displaced persons' implies, people who are passive, without
skill, ability, Initiative or hope, they have much to give..*. 
Despite the horrors they have hau to endure they have, as one 
skilled observer puts it, 'an almost obsessive will to live 
normally again.
Opponents of the bill continually claimed that admission
of these people would have an adverse effect on American society.
As Jeremiah J. Twomey, of the American Legion stated, "economic
overcrowding is likely to result from the introduction into this
country ...of so many thousands whose capacities to moke any
sound contribution to our economic life annot be said to have
been enhanced by the hatreds and prejudicles born of their war
176time experiences." ro Twomey concluded his statement by saying, 
"while it is true that the appeal of those who would admit 
hundreds of thousands of immigrants touches the heart, such 
generosity can only be practiced at the expense of our own people, 
and particularly our World war II veterans. Until the problems 
of housing anu the increasing unemployment potential have been 
solved, it is unwise to invite an increase in immigration."1^”
Morwin K. Hart of the National Economic Council stated 
that passage of the bill would be harmful to the United States 
because, "such immigration is generally against the interest of 
the American people, deceit and fraud have brought the huge 
numbers of refugees in the past illegally, and because increased 
immigration would tend to increase unemployment and make the 
housing problem worse."1™
These types of statements were continually made even though 
the Department of Labor stated that the United States could easily 
absorb these immigrants. In Phillip Hannah's (Assistant Secre*
tory of Labor) testimony ha danonatrated that tha "admission 
of A00,000 displaced persons contemplated by tha bill would 
have no harmful affect upon o u t economic life, based on the 
history of past immigration." '7
Not only was unemployment a problem referred to in the 
hearings, but some opponents of the bill even went as far as 
to argue that "Russia had planted espionage agents among the 
displaced pesons."1®®
Another part of the debate on the Stratton bill dealt 
with whether or not the United States had done its share in 
helping the D.P.»s or whether it had any obligation to do so.
Representative Stratton, the bill's sponsor stated that,
"?;e fought in the councils of the United Nations to prevent 
the forcible repatriation of the displaced to Communist-domin- 
ated lands. We have a moral obligation and a heavy responsibil­
ity to follow through. I.R.O. will help maintain these O.P.'s 
but cannot resettle them without action by us and other countries 
to receive them."1®1
Stratton also advocated the idea that "we cannot talk 
international cooperation and in practice reject it. Unless the 
U.S. takes its fair share of the displaced persons, the problem 
will remain. Other countries have indicated some willingness 
to take in some of the displaced, but they are awaiting our 
leadership."1®^
John Hllldring, Assistant Secretary of State, stated that 
although he aid not consider any certain number of D.P. 's as 
the United States' fair share, in investigating the D.P. problem, 
"we finally decided that if we were going to settle the problem,
the United States was going to have to act like a leader and 
set the standard itsolf by permitting some immigration into 
this country before we could get other countries to cooperate 
with us in the solution of this problem."1®*^
Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen Roberts stated 
that, "I have a deep conviction that if the United States makes 
a great gesture here in the interest of freedom and liberty, 
then the other countries will follow our example."1”**
In testifying against the theory that the U.S. had not done 
its fair share, some of the witnesses seem to have tried to blame 
the situation on the D.P. 's themselves. As John Williamson, of 
the Veterans of Foreign '.'/ars statu.'., "the veterans of World 
War II, as well as World War I, must question seriously the 
propriety of the displaced persons in Europe who, delivered from 
bondage at the cost of the blood of American youth, now seek 
to avoid their share in the responsibility for creating a new 
freedom and civilization in Europe."1®^
Again, Jeremiah Twomey of the American Legion stated that 
the United States did not owe anyone anything. "These young 
Americans have already contributed more than they ought to have 
been called upon to do for the establishment of human liberty 
throughout the world, and have a right to expect that our 
American statesmen would follow up their military successes with 
the type of diplomatic offensives that would help the discontent­
ed, war-weary peoples of the world to work out in tHcir own homes 
for themselves what our forefathers here worked oui for us."1®” 
Numerous other testimonies stated similar things. The 
end result being that Congress was polarized into the two lines
of opinion* "though the hearings had been held promptly and 
seemed to promise a swift decision, Congressional action was 
delayed throughout 1947* Despite a special message to Congress 
by Truman urging haste, the Judiciary Subcommittee failed to 
take any action on the Stratton bill."1®?
Due to the fact that the restrlctionlsts feared that they 
would lose if a vote on the bill were to come up at that time, 
they attempted to stall. Representative Gossett of Texas, 
denounced the bill on the House floor by stating numerous, 
things Including that, "while a. few good people remain in the 
u.P. camps, they are by and large the refuse of Europe. The 
camps are filled with bums, criminals, black-marketeers, sub­
versives, revolutionists, and crackpots of all colors and 
hues."1®® Gossett attempted to discredit the Stratton bill by 
stating that it was an avenue for the entraace of so-called 
"fifth columnists" into the United States.
In the Senate, Senator Revercomb tried another stalling 
tactic. Several Senators had called for a modified version 
of the Stratton bill and after this, Revercomb called for an 
Investigation into the D.P. stituation, because without it, 
Revercomb stated, "we will be very much handicapped in gaining 
information about the various bills dealing with the all-important 
subject of immigration in its different phases,"1®^ "Those 
favoring admission of displaced persons assailed Revercomb's resol­
ution as an inhumane delaying tactic, but after a sharp debate 
the Senate authorized the investigation and instructed Revercomb
to report by January 10, 1948. Thus the restrlctionlsts succeeded
1QOin postponing displaced persons legislation until after 19M)."
After the report on the D.P. conditions in Europe was 
mace when Congress reconvened, the "American Logion reversed its 
stand on the hearings."1'1 Furthermore, tho results of invest­
igations into the problem in Europe reported that, "the only 
solution of the problem that will remove the obstacle to a Qerman 
peace settlement and the constant source of friction in Germany... 
and will remove the present and prospective burden on the American 
taxpayer...is the settlement of these people in countries willing 
to receive them."l7^0ne of these countries is the United States.
The pressure finally mounted (with tho aid of another Truman 
request for action) so that "the Senate Judiciary Committee fin-
1Q l
ally reported out a displaced persons bill on March 2, 1948."
And in June, 1948 the Displaced Persons Act was passed.
However, this Act was extremely limited in scope and discrim­
inatory. Because of this, the battle was to rage on for another 
two years until the Act was amended.
The bill passed in June, 1948, "reluctantly 
did something, but not too much, and it was shot 
full of snares and bars that made it discriminatory 
and almost unworkable. It admitted only 220,000 
D.P.'s over a two-year period. It gave priorities 
to Baltic D.P.'s while effectively cutting off most 
Jews. It required that 30 percent of those .admitted 
be farmers. It called for housing and job guaran­
tees by sponsors. It imposed strict security 
screening. And it 'mortgaged' the regular immig­
ration quotas of the future by 30 percent a year 
to 'repay' for D.P.'s allowed to enter the United 
States under its terms."'94
One of the most controversial points of this bill was debatod 
vigorously in the Senate and later passed as part of the bill.
The bill stated that persons in the D.P. camps on or before 
December 22, 194? could be served by this bill. That, of course, 
was the date of President Truman's directive on refugee immigration
Opponents argued against this date on two grouaas. First, they 
"favorec. the date of ap n l  21, 19^7 (which marked the closing 
of the displaced persons camps to any newcomers by order of 
General Clay), pointing out that the inclusion of tiiic ciate 
would enhance the feasibility of administration, as displaced 
persons residing in the camps on that date had been catalogued 
amd registered."1^ 5 Secondly, the "December date was also callea 
discriminatory on the grounds that recent refugees would not be 
eligible, particularly Jews from Eastern Europe were religious 
persecution still prevailed."1^ ®
Although many people, including President Truman, were upset 
by the bill the Congress passed, Truman signed the bill into law 
on the basis that Congress v;as no longer in session that year and 
as the President stated, "if 1 refused to sign this bill, now, 
there would be no legislation on behalf of displaced persons until 
the next session of C o n g r e s s . " T r u m a n ,  and many others, includ­
ing members of the C.C.D.p. felt that the bill could be amended 
later one. that it could do something, even if very little in the 
meantime.
After the bill became law, the C.C.D.P. and other groups went 
back to work on behalf of getting the bill amended.
In June of 19M), the drive to amend the Displaced Persons 
Act began. It quickly became caught-up in the political arena as 
cries of "discrimination" were heard from both sides. "Both political 
parties incorporated the D.P. issue in their 19it-8 political plat­
forms, advocating liberalization".1^ ®
"Early in 1 9 W f a bill recommended by the Displaced Persons 
Commission, established by President Truman to administer the 19M*
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Act, vat intro ucea by Representative Cellar, Democrat of 
New ori, in t e House and by Senators McGrath, Democrat 
of Ru.) e I -lan anu Neely, Democrat of west Virginia in the
Senate.” ^  1
-n March 2 5 , '949, hearings opened on the proposed amend- 
aents to the jisplaced Persons Act. At the opening, Ugo 
Carusi, Chairman of the Displaced Persons Commission testified 
that there were still about "750,000 D.P.'s in the American,
British, and French Zones of Germany, Austria and Italy.
Testimony by witnesses seemed this time to be more in favor 
of allowing the D.P.'s in. At least, there were less restriction- 
ist testimonies thun in the previous hearings on the Stratton 
bill. The Arguments posed by the restrictionists were, at best, 
weak. Their defense was basically the same as it was at the 
Stratton bill hearings, and this time the pressure from the other 
side was mounting. For example, Charles Miller, District of 
Columbia Secretary for the Daughters of America which claimed 
to represent 143,000, testified that his organization passed a 
resolution calling for a complete, temporary ban on immigration.
They based this judgement on the fact that "a snortage of housing
202was present and the unemployment level was too high."
As the pressure mounted from all angles to let the D.P.'s in, 
Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, Chairman of the Subcommittee of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, which was responsible for the report 
on the propseu amendment, dia everything he could to stall making 
a report. He managed to keep this bill in committee for nearly 
a year.
"In this campaign of obfuscation, McCarran held 20 committee
hearings in the summer and early fall of 1948* He then vent to 
Europe for almost two months to ferret out the 'fraud' ^ mis­
management' ,'security leaks', and the like which he charged 
against the administration of the program set up under the 
19W act, even though hardly any u.P.'s were coming in through
205its operation." While in Europe, McCarran even conducted 
hearings there which were printed with the other hearings on 
the bill.201f
* 4
Finally, on January 25, 1950 McCarran's committee reported 
the bill. The Judiciary Committee "approved a heavily amended 
version of the Celler bill which retained many of the restrictive 
features of the existing act. a later cut-off date of January 
1, 19h9 was retaineu, although the Baltic and agricultural 
priorities v/ere reinstated.
The most controversial feature of the amendment was the 
"provision which redefined displaced persons to include the 
Volksaeutsche (persons of German ethnic origin). Congress had 
accepted the I.R.O. definition which had excludea the Volksdeuteche 
and dealt with them separately by giving them a preference under 
the German and Austrian quotas." °
In response to this, a group of Senators backed by Senator 
Lehman of Hew York pushed for a substitute bill which was based 
on the same grounds as the original Celler bill.
This substitutive bill had "removed the Baltic and agricul­
tural preferences...and the provisions discriminating against 
Jews. Refugees such as Greeks and Volksdeutsche created by the 
aftermath of the war were included in limited numbers. An over­
all figure of l*.15,7k k persons was set as the ne ceiling of admis- 
sable D.P.'s."2®?
"McCarran and his cohorts did everything possible to 
hold up action on the bill.... In an unprecedented 13-hour 
session, during which over 100 attempts to stop the bill by 
the restricitonists failed, the Senate passed the bill on April 
8 , 1950. The conference version worked out by the House was 
almost identical and was passed by both bodies on June 6 and 
7. On June 16, 1950, the President signed it into law."^® 
a four-year battle had finally come to end. However, 
the battle had actually gone on for over 26 years. This was 
the first time since 1921*, that our immigration laws were liber­
alized. a concrete plan for the displaced persons was now in 
full swing.
The following table has been taken from the Congressional 
SSifili*209 It compares and contrasts the differences in the two 
versions of the L.P. Act.
1948 Act Amended Act
I.R.G. Displaced Persons 200,000 
German Expellees (volksdeutsche) 27,377
Polish Veterans -------
Greek Displaced Persons .......Pl1Y«nnAon Da fit m n s e  fvinm _....
3C:,500 
54,744 
18,000 
10,000 
4,000 
2,000 
5,000 
5,000 
500
15,000
VflnuzlA w A u l l i  a  P A f u t f f t A sw A a*\2IUiXJbCm l l g  A U 0 U P O
Displaced Orphans 
Adopted Orphans 
Recent Refugees 
Adjustment of Status of D.P.>s 
in the United States
3,000
’*2,000
15,000
TOTAL 21,7,37? 415,744
Charged to i}uota 
Nonquota (Children) 
Total
A°5,7M,
10,000
i,15,7M, —
B. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
1. PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN
Of the two Presidents in office during the worlci War II 
Ora, Horry S. Truman was the most sympathetic toward the plight 
of displace^ persons in Europe. For it was during the Truman 
Administration that concrete action was taken on behalf of the 
refugees. It was also during that Administration that legis­
lation was passed permitting the admission of over 1*00,000 
displaced persons.
On April 12, 1945* Truman assumed the duties of the Presidency 
following the death of Franklin i», Roosevelt. Truman began 
wo riling on the o.P. situation quite early, as he wrote is his 
diary of April 15» 1952,
"Yesterday I welcomed the last Displaced Person 
and his family to the United States.... Jhen I was 
at Potsdam (July, 191*5) I looked into the displace a 
person situation. At that time there were 1,200,000 
of them from all the countries nir~' in Eastern 
Europe. After I arrived at Washington., I askew 
Jick Russell, Chairman of the emigration committee 
in thJ Senate, and his opposite number in the 
House...to go to Germany and them see me about 
a plan for taking care of them.... The two reported 
that we had enough • furriners* in xhis country 
and we needed no more. I reminded them that 'die- 2.a 
placed persons' made this great nation what it is." w
Truman saw the needs of the D.P.'s and began taking action
to help them. "One moans by which President Truman sought to
relievo the distress was by issuing a directive on December 22,
191*5* that would enable refugees anc displaces persons to obtain 
immigrant visas to the United States within the limits of the 
immigration quota law. While this Presiuential uirective made 
little immediate impact on relieving the refugee problem, it 
presaged Truman's later actions and the period during which
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the basic features of the quota lan were inexorably changed and
ultimately nullified."^'
Prior to the issuance of the directive on refugee immigra­
tion, Truman had written * letter tc General Eisenhower concerning 
the conditions of the displaced persons in camps in Germany. Truman 
was prompted to write this letter by reading Earl G. Harrison'a 
report on the conditions of the camps. The letter stated that 
"the announced policy has been to give such (displaced) persona
preference over the German civilian population in housing. But
212tha practice seems to be quite another thing#" Truman ordered 
Eisenhower to requisition housing from the German civilian pop­
ulation because they "cannot escape responsibility for what they 
have brought upon themselves." J  Truman closed by stating that 
"we must make clear to the German people that we thoroughly abhor 
the Nazi policies of hatred and persecution. We have no better 
opportunity to demonstrate this than by tho mannor in which we 
ourselves actually treat the survivors remaining in Germany.
After the President had taken care of the problems in the 
J.P. camps, he turned his energies toward other aspects of the 
refugee problem. One of these aspects was the problem of the 
Jewish D.P.'s. Whereas Franklin Roosevelt did not want to put 
pressure on the British to admit Jewish refugees from Europe into 
Palcstfce, Truman saw no reason to hold back on the British.
Of course, it can be argued that Roosevelt was in a different 
situation than Truman simply due to the fact that the war was 
over when Truman got involved. However, had Roosevelt gotten 
the British to open up Palestine, and evacuate Jews, many of the 
pre-war problems may have been solved.
*■
In any case, President Truaan aid try to get the gates 
to Palestine opened. As he stated, "It will be recalled that 
when Mr. Harrison reported on the conditions of the displaced 
persons in Europe, I Immediately urged that steps be taken to 
relieve the situation of these persons to the extent of admit­
ting 100,000 Jews into Palestine."^1^
The British response to this was less than favorable. The 
British were quick to point out that the United States had not 
done its fair share in admitting D.P.'s prior to this. However, 
Truman's initiative resulted in the formation of the Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry.
The President was aware of the fact that the British were 
correct in their statement about the United States policy towara 
the refugees. Therefore, he turned his energies toward home and 
began pushing for legislation to allow these people Into the 
United States.
.Thy die. Truman concern himself with the Jews and the situation 
in Palestine so deeply? As Truman stated, "the fate of the Jew­
ish victims of Hitlerism was a matter of deep personal concern to 
me. I have always been disturbed by the tragedy of people who 
have bean made victims of intolerance and fanaticism because of
21 fttheir race, color, or religion." Truaan further stated that 
he knew Russia and Poland had been terrible persecutors of the 
Jews, but that the Nazi behavior was "one of the most shocking 
crimes of all times." ' As Truman said, "I was fully aware of 
the Arabs' hostility to Jewish settlement in Palestine, but, like 
many Americans, I was troubled by the plight of the Jewish people 
in Europe."^1® This prompted the President to take action where
■ n *  )
others had refused to do so previously.
During the period of negotiations on Palestine, the President 
was subject to personal attacks by the British, but he aid not 
back down. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
recommended partioning Palestine into two states; one Arab, the 
other Jewish. Although the Arabs were quite hostile to this idea 
and threatened war in the face of it, Truman instructed the State 
Department to support the partition plsn.2^
Next, the President began focusing on getting legislation 
passed in favor of displaced persons immigration to the United 
States. Unlike President Roosevelt's inexplicable silence in 
regard to legislation on the problem, Truman did not hesitate 
to speak to Congress on these matters, ./he re as Roosevelt would 
not press Congress for any action in this respect, Truman did 
not feel constrained by domestic politics to remain silent.
In his State of the Union message on January 6, 1947, the 
President urged Congress to pass D.P. legislation. "So far as 
admitting displacea persons is concerned, I do not feel that the 
United States has done its part. Only about 5,000 of them have 
entered this country since May, 1946.... Congressional assistance 
in the form of new legislation la needed. I urge the Congress to 
turn its attention to this world problem in an effort to find ways 
whereby we can fulfill our responsibilities to these thousands 
of homeless and suffering refugees of all faiths."220
In the six months which passed after the State of the Union 
Address Congress had done nothing. On July 7, 1947, Truman sent 
a special message to Congress regarding the displaced persons 
matter. In this message, the President stated,
"The only civilized course is to enable 
these people to take new roots in friendly 
soil* ill ready certain countries of Western 
Europe and Latin America have opened their 
ooors to substantial numbers of these displaced 
persons.... Vic ourselves should admit a substan­
tial number as immigrants. V/e have not yet 
been able to do this because our present statutory 
quotas applicable to the Eastern European areas 
from which most of these people come are wholly 
inadequate for this purpose. Special legislation 
limited to this particular emergency will 
therefore be necessary...."22'
Congress finally passed the Dir.placed Persons Act 
in 19W. However, the Act was not what the President had wanted. 
Upon signing the Act, the President explained his reasons for 
doing so and urged the Congress once again to act on the problem. 
This time, by revising the act. As the President stated on June 
25, 1943, "it is with very great reluctance that 1 signed the 
Displaced Persons Act. If the Congress wore still in session,
I would return this bill without my approval and urge that a 
fairer, more humane bill be passed. In its present form, thic:
'oil1 1.:- flagrantly discriminatory". The President explained 
his reasoning for signing the bill by stating that, "if 1 
refused to sign this bill now, there would b^ no legislation on 
behalf of displaced persons until the next session of the Congress 
The President berated the Congress in his statement for their poor 
action on this bill.
A large protion of the President's statement dealt with the 
fact that the bill discriminated against Jews and Catholics.
"The primary device used to discriminate against 
Jewish displaced persons is the provision restricting 
eligibility to those displaced parsons who entered 
Germany, Austria or Italy on or before December 
22, 19Jt5. Host of the Jewish displaced persons who 
had entered Germany, Austria or Italy by that time 
had already left; and most of the Jewish displaced 
persons in those areas arrived there after December
22, 1945.... Mors than 90# of the remaining 
^Jewish2g|splacec. persons are definetely ex-
The President also complained of discrimination against 
Catholics. "Many anti-Communist refugees of Catholic faith fled 
into the American zones after December 22, 1945, in order to 
escape persecution in countries dominated by a communist form 
of government. These too are barred by the December 22, 1945 
dateline."22^
The President was also dissatisfied with the fact that the 
bill charged the D.P.'s to the quotas. In light of these reasons, 
the President asked Congress to amend the act when it reconvened.
as Truman campaigned for the Presidency in 1943, he used 
this time to berate the "Republican 80th Congress that doesn't 
want the victims of World War II to come to the United States and 
get a fresh start in life."22^
Truman's style of public denouncement of the Congress in 
regard to the D.P. Act was something totally different from that 
of President Roosevelt. While F.D.R. never spoke against Congress 
on this subject, and never even stated his support for such things 
as the Wagner-Rogers Act, Truman used his position to try and sway 
Congress. It seems as though Roosevelt was worried about his 
political position more than Truman was. Roosevelt was afraid 
of the restrictionist sentiment going against him. Truman did 
not use any stalling devices like Roosevelt did (The dvian Conf­
erence, for example).
Of course, ohe must consider the fact that Truman had popular 
support in regard to displaced persons legislation as time pro­
gressed whereas Roosevelt did not. Truman was also concerned with
a different type of foreign policy than Roosevelt was. As 
he stated in his memoirs,
'•I hod a very good picture of what a revival 
of isolationism would mean for the world. After 
’.Vorid '.Vex II it was clear that without American 
participation there was no power capable of 
meeting Russia as an equal. If we were to turn 
our back on the worlu, areas weakened and divided 
as a result of the war would fall into Soviet 
orbit without much effort on the part of the 
Russians."22?
It is possible that Truman saw aiding the displaced persons 
as a way for the United States to demonstrate its leadership 
in, and care for, the world.
2. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The attitudes and actions of the Department of State in the 
post-war years seemed to change as time progressed, of course, 
much of tho v/ork with displaced persons was handled by the Dis­
places Persons Commission. However, the behavior of State itself 
in this period was in some ways similar to its behavior during the 
war years. Apparently, the bureaucratic design of the Department 
renders it subject to weak control by its head. This resulted in 
poor treatment of D.P.'s trying to immigrate for quite a wnile.
The Department of State was heacieu by two secretaries in 
the post-war era James F. Byrnes was the first, serving from 
19A5 to 19V? anu General George C. Marshall was the second serving 
throughout the auratlon of the era. These men were favorable 
toward immigration of displaced persons into the United States.
Secretary Byrnes was in favor of aiding the D.P.'s. As 
he remarked in his memoirs, in regard to a meeting with the 
Russian Foreign Minister Molotov. "I told Molotuv that we 
took the position that we must give asylum to the political
ppQ
refugees." ^  There v/ere oU.er occasions also, when Byrnes 
stated that he favored taking care of the refugees.
Secretary Marshall was also in favor of admitting the dis­
placed persons into the United States. As he testified at the 
hearings on the Stratton bill,
"In our ciscussions with other countries, 
we are constahtly met with the question. ' V/hat 
is the United States, which is urging others to 
accept these people as useful and desirable
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immigrants, doing about accepting a part
of them itself?' If we practice what we
preach, if wo admit a substantial number
of these people as immigrants, then with
v/hat others are already doing and will uo.
v;e can actually bring an end to this tragic
situation. In so doing, we will also confirm
our moral leadership and demonstrate that wo >20 •
are not retreating behind the Atlantic Ocean."
Marshall was pushing for the passage of this legislation.
However, in the war years, it was not the Secretary of State 
himself that attempted to block aid to the D.P.'s. Cordell Hull 
was not trying to keep the D.P.'s out, it was Breckinrld/e Long 
and the people under him that were causing the problems.
It seemr that in this caGe, history was destined to repeat 
itself. This time, however, the problem was more or less with the 
consuls themselves. In regard to the Truman directive, "the spirit 
in which the directive had been issued was lost in the maelstrom 
of regulation superimposed by the consular and immigration ser- 
vices. Hapless displaced persons were their victims."
Although in several instances the bureaucratic problems 
were solved here in the United States, "the larger and more diverse 
bureaucracy in Europe functioned neither as smoothly ror as swiftly 
for refugees outside the American continent."2^1 Some of the 
problems in regard to this were attributed to Ugo Carusi, Commis­
sioner of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and Chairman 
of the U?S. Commission on Displaced persons. Among other things, 
"Carusi and his colleagues decided arbitrarily that December 22,
19A5, would be the aay prior to which determination of D.P. status 
would be maue :in order to avoid an influx of people' into the \ 
United states zones of occupation...."2-*2 The result of this was 
that "concentration camp survivors who hau left Germany for countries
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of origin to seek family members and returned to the United 
States zone after that datet were thus declarou ineligible, as
v/ero all those who found themselves in the British, French or
2'63Russian zones."
It was not Carusi alone, however, that caused many of the 
problems in processing the displaced persons. "Processing by 
consuls was inordinately slow. In their interpretation, of the 
directive in relation to the quota law they demanded that original 
certificates or certified copies from the issuing authorities 
attesting to place of birth, marriage, evidence of death of a 
spouse, etc. be provided all or most of which were difficult, if 
not impossible to obtain."
This was not the only obstacle provider by the consuls.
"Consuls were arbitrary in the use of tho 'wide latitude and ciscret- 
ionary powers' with which they wore vested. They also established 
their own definitions of persons eligible to reeeiv?;visas as
n.,.. ;; Polish visa applicant or..I his son, the only survivors 
of a family incarcerates by the Russians and then the carmans were 
refused visas because they 'hau not been persecuted enough'....
"In Vienna, Jews persecuted by the Nazis 
and deprived of their property were declared 
ineligible under the terms of the directive 
because they had returned to their former 
domiciliary area, despite the fact that both 
tho United States Army and U.N.R.R.A. had 
recognized their D.P. status and had regis­
tered them as such. Almost a year passed 
before the consul in Vienna was persuades to 
revise his stand on the eligibility of Viennese 
Jews and began to process their visa applic­
ations." 235
Because of these actions the goals of the Truman directive 
were not reached. It was not until after passage of the Displaced 
Persons Act that things began moving at a reasonable speed.
The domestic offices of the department of State seemed 
to look at the displaced persons from an angle which changed 
with the times. In other words, opinions of the Department 
were different during different stages of the post-war era.
One example of this concerns the Office of Public Affairs.
In March, 19^ f7* prior to the passage of the Displaced 
Persons Act, the Office of Public Affairs published a pamphlet 
in its series of "Foreign Affairs Background Summaries" entitled 
The International Refugee Organization. This pamphlet was designed 
to give "background information on refugees ana displaced persons". 
The overall tone of the pamphlet seems to be slightly negative.
The pamphlet statos such things as "the care ana maintenance 
of these million and a quarter refugees ana displaced persons 
is a burden on occupation authorities and a continuing cost to 
t a x p a y e r s . T h e  pamphlet also says that "American policy favors 
the resettlement of 100,000 Jews in Palestine. The remainder of 
the refugees an., displaced persons need to be resettled elsewhere 
throughout the world."
Nearly a year later, in January, 19ff6, the same office printed 
another pamphlet ontitled Of course, in this
relatively short period of time sentiment toward admission of 
D.P.'s had changed.
This pamphlet tries to demonstrate how tho stereotypes against 
D.P.'s are false. It then proceeds to explain that special legis­
lation is necessary to admit the D.P.'s. It quotes the President's 
special message to Congress (July 7, 1947) in wh ;h Truman appealec 
for legislative action. It even goes so for to say that "it is 
not expected that any legislation which may be approved by tho
Congress to allow immigration of displaced persons to this 
country will add appreciably to the housing problem in the 
United States.1'2^
In other words, in a period of nine months the Office of 
Public Affairs of the State Department completely turned its 
attitude around.
The point being made is that although the heads of the 
State Department publicly came out in favor of D.P. immigration, 
their attitudes did not necessarily prevail through the ranks 
of the Department. It seemoa as though the lower ranking 
officials (include.. consuLs), followed tho general prevailing 
American sentiment at the time. ..'hen public sentiment changed 
in favor of D . P .  admission, lower level State Department sentiment 
change;1, also.
It seems as though the Secretaries of State had neither little 
knowledge nor concern with how their officers handled European 
refugees. This was the case both -uring and after the war. The 
result of this was that less refugees were admitted into the 
United States than could have been. Thousands suffered due to 
disorganization in the bureaucracy of the Department of State.
3. THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR
The Department of War woxfced very closely with the displaced 
persons after the war. The United States Army had the responsibility 
of taking care of the displaced persons in the United States Zone. 
Although other organizations were established (such as U.N.R.R.A.) 
for the purpose of aiding the D.P.• s, the Army still retained ul­
timate control and authority over these people.
The United States Zonal Agreement with U.N.R.R.A. stated that,
"The Commanding General, United states Forces, European 
Theatre (U.S.F.E.T.), retains cver-all responsibility 
for the care, control, and movement of displaced persons 
in the United States Zone. U.N.R.R.A., subject to the 
laws, general orders, rules, and regulations, directives 
and overall supervision of the commanding general,
U.S.F.E.T., will to the extent permitted by the resol­
utions of the U.N.R.R.A. Council, perform designated 
functions relating to..dlsplaccu persons within the 
United States Zone."2™
Therefore, power was given to U.N.R.R.A., although ultimate 
responsibility for making decisions concerning the D.P.'s was 
retained by the Army.
The Army had to rely on itself at the beginning of the 
D.P. operations at liberation. "Although U.N.R.R.A. had given 
substantial assistance to the displaced persons during the summer 
of 19if5» there had been an unfortunate three months delby in the 
assignment of its personnel, with the result that U.N.R.R.A. did 
not reach full strength during the period of mass repatriation 
when help was most urgently needed.
Much debate has been focused on whether or not the Army 
treated the displaced persons, especially Jewish displaced persons 
fairly. Much resentment on the part of Army personnel seemed .to 
stem toward the Jewish D.P.'s partly due to the fact that they aid
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not want to bo treated aa members of the other nationality groups 
such as Germans, Poles, Czechs, etc. The reason that the Jewish 
D . P . ' s  felt t h i s  way was because they felt that there was no one 
area in Avu-r.'va to v/hich they could return without being persecuted 
again.
Earl 0. Harrison toured the displaced persons centers in 
1945 and reported to President Truman on the conditions of the 
camps. Following the report, Harrison published the resultB of 
it. He focused on one segment of the displaced persons, tho 
Jewish j .P.'g . Harrison explained that, "in spite of chaotic 
communication and transportation conditions after V-E day, over 
if,000,000 of the 6,500,000 exiles had been moveu out of Germany 
by July, and the number continued to climb. Dy late October 
about one million remained."^1 
Harrison continued,
"some a r e  i n  la w  and i n  f a c t  s t a t e l e s s .  Home 
a r e  u n w i l l i n g  to  Live  under R u s s ia n -d o m in a t e d  
re g im e s  i n  P olan d ana Y u g o s l a v i a ,  o r  i n  B a l t i c  
c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a re  now p o r t  o f  the U . B . S . R . . . .
As the political picture becomes clearer, many 
will doubtless change their minds anu seek 
repatriation. It has been apparent for some 
months, however, that eventually we shall come 
down to a hard core of at least one hundred 
thousand people, for whom some solution outside 
the gigantic repatriation program must be found.
In the main, they will be Polish, Hungarian,
Rumanian, and Austrian Jews."242
Harrison stated that most of the "Jews felt that they were being 
treated not as our fellow-fighters against totalitarianism, 
but much moro like prisoners."^*'* Harrison reported to President 
Truman that "as matters now stand, we appear to be treating the 
Jews as the Nazis treated them, except that we do not exterminate 
them."^* Harrison recommended that the Jews bo evacuated.
"He also urged immigration under existing Ians into the 
United States, and reported that 'many* Jews wished to go to 
Palestine because they realized that their opportunity to be 
admitted into the United States or into other countries in the 
.Vestern Hemisphere was limited."2^
In light of the terrible conditions in the camps which the 
Harrison report detailed, President Truman wrote General Eisen­
hower on August 31i 19h5 in Germany.
In his letter, Truman stated that, "while Mr. Harrison 
makes due allowance for the fact that during the early days of 
liberation, the huge task of mass repatriation required main 
attention, he reports conditions which now exist and which require 
prompt remedy. These conditions...are not in conformity with 
policies promulgated by S.H.A.E.F. (Supreme High Command-Allied 
Expeditionary Forces).... In other words, the policies are not 
being carried out by some of your subordinate officers."2^
Tho President went on to describe some examples of this 
complaint. He advised Eisenhower to clean up the conditions 
because, as he quoted from Harrison's report, "one is led to 
wonder whether the German people, seeing this, are not supposing 
that we are following or at least condoning Nazi p o l i c y . " H e  
closed by stating that we "have a responsibility toward these 
victims of persecution and tyranny who are in our zone."21*®
General Eisenhower "later reported that real efforts were 
being made to improve the conditions of the Jews."2^  Part of 
these efforts included "a series of orders establishing special 
centers for Jews with Jewish administrators, providing special 
and larger rations, and initiating other means to alleviate the 
lots of the Jews. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Comm­
ittee (A.J.J.D.C. or "Joint"), for all practical purposes was 
put in charge of the Jens in the United States Zones, aid Eisen­
hower appointed a special Adviser on Jewish Affairs."2* 1
Eisenhower issued an order which contained the major pol­
icies related to the treatment of displaced persons. Included 
in this was an order for frequent inspection of the commanders 
(of the camps). The order stated that those who were incompetent 
should be "instantly relieved",2 '^
Eisenhower himself visited some of the camps and replied 
to President Truman's letter an:, the Harrison report. In his 
reply, Eisenhower stated that "since Mr. Harrison's visit in July 
many changes have taken place with respect to the condition of 
Jewish and other displaced persons. Except for temporarily 
crowded conditions...housing is on a reasonable basis. Never­
theless efforts to improve their condition continue unabated. 
Subordinate commanders are under orders to requisition German 
houses, grounds, and other facilities without hesitation...,"2^2 
Eisenhower further stated that "special centers have been 
established for Jewish displaced persons.... On July £5, 19A5,
Or. Rabbi Israel Goldstein, President of the United Jewish Appeal 
recommended that non-repatrlatable Jews be separated from other 
stateless people,,..in exclusively Jewish centers...the American 
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was called upon to supervise 
the establishment of these centers."2*^
Eisenhower closed by saying that "in certain instances we 
have fallen below standard, but I should like to point out that 
a whole army has been faced with the intricate problems of re­
adjusting from combat to mass repatriation, and then to the pres-
ent static phase with its unique welfare problems."2^
In the summer of 1945, muss migrations of Polish Jews, 
who were being subjected to a resurgence of anti-semitism in 
that country began migrating to occupieo Germany and Austria.
Moot of these people went into the United States Zones. "The 
military authorities of the United States Zones of Germany and 
Austria took no action during the remainder of 1945 to stop the 
infiltration of Jews. On the contrary, as a result of Truman's 
expressed sympathy for Jews and the growing conviction that all 
European Jews were properly entitled to special consideration as 
victims of German persecution, the military authorities uecideu 
-uring December to continue special care for all Jews and to acc­
omodate them in separate centers."2*^
Leonard Dinnerstein, in hir. article, "The U.S. Army and the 
Jews: Policies Toward the displaced Persons After V/orld iVar II," 
contends that treatment of these j.P.'s was not quite as gooc as 
most people felt it was. He attributes most of this to lower- 
ranking military personnel who were not as concerned about Jewish 
D.P.'s as the superiors were.
Dinnerstein states that "despite initial shortages and admin­
istrative confusion, the Army did a generally creditable job. Un­
fortunately, through the initial phases, and later stabilization 
period, subordinate military personnel often showed little awareness 
of the particular difficulties encountered by Jewish Displaced 
Persons. This lack of sympathy compounded the enormous problems 
alrcauy burdening the Jews."2^®
Dinnerstein claims that "one of the army's first mistakes 
was to ignore that section of the Handbook for Military Government
•in Germany, prepare by 3.II.A.E.F...which mandated that "inmates 
cf concentration camps should be, if under restraint by the 
German authorities on racial, political, or religious grounds 
treated U3 United Nations displaced persons..."2”  Dinnerstein 
argues that officers v/ho v/ere not concerned about this order, 
"segregated the E.P.*s according to nationality; hence German, 
Austrian, Hungarian, Roumanian, Bulgarian, and Italian Jews v/ero 
labeled former 'enemy nationals' not entitled to the special 
care given to citizens of U.N. countries."2^®
Dinnerstein states that it was reports such as this that 
prompted the intervention of Truman and caused him to send 
Harrioon to Europe to investigates. Therefore, these problems 
occurred before Truman's letter reached Eisenhower, oinnerstein 
agrees that Elsenhower's swift action corrected many of the prob­
lems in the D.P. centers. However, Dinnerstein maintains that 
"despite the improvement, 'many of General Eisenhower's policies 
were pigeon-holed and, in some instances, deliberately overlooked 
by commanders in the field.'"2”
One such example was that of the third army area under the 
command of General George S. Patton. "Rabbi Juuah Nadich, one 
of Eisenhower's Jewish Advisors, toured the area in October, 1945, 
and discovered that Jews escaping from Poland were not accepted 
into the D.P. camps but non-Jewish Poles were. This was not an 
isolated example. General Eisenhower and his deputy, General 
Oalter Bedoll Smith, found themselves constantly prodedng Patton 
to treat the D.P.'s decently."2®®
" S u b o r d i n a t e  commanders a l s o  found t h e i r  oruerG ig n o r e d  o r  
sabotaged by junior officers. In 1946, a U.N. observer, Ira 
Hirschmann, claimed that one camp, Funk Caserne, had degeneratea
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into •indescribable chaos. Originally intended as a transition 
center it became a oe facto D.P. facility. A latrine intended
for the use of ten to twelve people serviced 1800} a place for
pc  1
300 beus contained 800,..." The Army commander who received 
Hirschmann's complaint was uneer the impression that the camp 
had been abandoned. After the complaint was received the camp 
was ordered closed within a few days.
Finally, Dinnerstein attributes many of the problems to the 
fact that the American G.I.'s had little tolerance for the D.P.'a.
"Jewish observers continually reported 
G.I.'s as being unusually rough towards, and 
unsympathetic to, the displaced persons. Many 
•American soldiers seemed to agree with the 
Germans that the Jews wero responsible for their 
own plight. An American sergeant decide'.. 'Jews 
woro no damn goo-,' an- therefore, 'he ain't 
gonna give them anymore food,' and a lieutenant 
complained that, 'we feed and house the refugees 
yet, instead of showing their gratitude...they 
treat us as if we were their jailors'. An 
American Jewish Committee observer discovered 
the results of some troop attitude surveys from 
an officer 'forbidden by his superiors from 
releasing them'. The representative later 
wrote that 'a very high proportion of G.I.'s 
believe, apparently, that Hitler was partly 
right in his treatment of the Jews.'"«2
The Army attempted to combat this anti-semitism through
different publications but the effects of these were unlikely
to be helpful.
Much of the poor relations between Army personnel and all 
the D.P.'s in general was attributable to the tensions between 
the two groups due to the adverse cmiitions which all, D.P.'s 
especially, were facing. For example, as General Lucius D.
Clay, deputy to General Eisenhower for Military Government 
stated,
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"nineteen forty-seven was a difficult year 
for the D.P.'s. Resettlement was negligible and 
there seenc.. little hope of their finding new 
hones an.,, opportunities.... In the face of despair, 
morale in the camps dropped off and there was a 
consequent breakdown in character which led to 
black market and similar activities. Reports 
concerning the extent of these activities were 
often exaggerated, an*., considering the conui- 
tions un^cr which these people lived, their 
behavior was most creditable."26o
Much credit toward aid for the displaces persons, oust be 
given to the voluntary agencies, particularly the A.J.J.D.C., 
which worked closely with the Army and U.H.R.R.a . in aiding the 
D.P.'3 .
"After the establishment of Israel there was a 
ntcasy an., well-organizad migration of Jews 
from the ’.Vostern Zones of Germany and nustria, 
an., from Italy. The 250,000 Jews estimated 
to be in this area during 19A7 were rapidly 
moves to the new state, although infiltration 
of other Jews from central Europe continued 
until June, 19A9. By 51 December 19W, the 
number dropped to 61,000 persons. By the end 
of 1950 to 59,000.... During 1951 migrations 
to the U.S., Israel and elsewhere took, plucc.
The Jewish refugee problem in the Western 
Zones of Germany and Austria and in Italy 
could bo sudd to have come to an cnd."2°d
The U.;J. Army had taken care of the D.P.'s. The case of 
army treatment of these people was typical of most U.S. behavior 
in similar situations. The State Department heads hau officially 
been in favor of D.P. aid, yet their subordinates managed to inter­
fere. This was true for the Army also. The Army completed its 
Job. Generals Eisenhower and Clay die put their efforts into 
caring for the D.p.'s as best as they could, whether or not their 
subordinates did remains questionable.
C. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITS!) STATES
Although it would seem that public opinion in the Uniteu 
States toward D.P.'s would have changed drastically in the United 
States after the war, the change was slow to come.
The limited amount of information available through public 
opinion polls reveals how slowly the change aid come.
On June 26, 19A6, the American Institute of Public opinion 
asked,"Would you approve or disapprove a plan to require each 
nation to take in a given number of Jewish and othor European 
refugees, based upon the size and population of each nation?"
The responses were that "^0# of the sample approve*.;, A9# -iasp- 
prove- and 11# hat; no opinion."2®^
On August 28, 1946, A.I.P.O. asked the same question. In 
a perioc; of two months, the statistics changed slightly. This 
time "37# approved, if8# disapproved and 1 5 #haa no opinion."2^* 
on the same oay, A.I.P.O. also asked, "President Truman plans to 
ask Congress to allow more Jewish ana other European refugees 
to come to the United States to live than are now allowed unaer 
the law. Would you approve or disapprove of this iaea?" "16# 
said- they would approve, 12# said they haa no opinion, and an 
overwhelming 7 2# disapproved."2®?
On September 25, 19^6, A.I.P.O. asked, "About a million Polish 
people, Jews, and other displaced persons must find new homes in 
different countries. Do you think the United States should 
let any of these displaced persons enter the country? 36# responded 
yes, 6# had no opinion, and 56# said no."2®®
The Gallup Poll reported on January 13, 19A6 that the "public
-9*f-
favors decreased immigration, and that of prospective immigrants, 
admission of dutch, Scandinavians, Belgians and Kngli&is pre­
ferred.
"The conviction that the Unitea States must do it part in 
offering resettlement opportunities to the displaced persons aid 
not spring into full bloom on the part of the American people 
overnight. Too few people knew about the situation and two few 
cared."2”0 Even over a year after the war had ended, public op­
inion was not in favor of refugee immigration. As the surveys 
discussed above show, as of August, 191*6, the public did not even 
support President Truman's request to let ij.P.'s enter the United 
States.
"As the facts began to come in, concern diu manifest itself 
in certain quarters and steadily increased. The ethnic groups 
whose nationality backgrounds were akin to those in the D.P. 
camps were among the first to feel that something should be done."
Religious groups, particularly Catholic onu Jewish began to 
exert increasing pressure on government officials, particularly 
Congressmen.
Voluntary organizations such as the American Friends Service 
Committee (A.F.S.C.) and the Citizens Committee on Displaced Per­
sons (C.C.D.P.), attempted to educate the public on the problems 
of D.P.'a throughout the period. For example, A.F.S.C. published
such brochures as The Problem of 12 Million German Refuses in
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The C.C.D.P. worked extremely hard at alerting the American 
public to the D.P. situation.
"At the end of the war, the public was 
unaware of the very existence of displaced 
persons.... When most of the D.P.'s were re­
patriated the public was slow to grasp the 
nature of the remaining d.P.'s dilemma and to 
comprehend why that 'hare core* would not go 
home. On these points, the C.C.O.P. had to 
hammer again and again, tolling and re-telling 
the facts and explaining the alternatives.
The cumulative effects of this exposition, 
supplemented many fold by other writers, com­
mentators ana media of communication, finally 
hit their mark...the public in general was at 
last aware of the issue."273
The press, of course, had an effect on swaying the attitudes 
of Americans. It launched out vigorously against the restriction- 
ist sentiment that had prevailed in the early years after the war. 
"Life magazine reflected the opinion of many when it declaroa 
editorially on September 2 3 , 19^6 that tho most shocking fact about 
the plight of these displaceu persons is not that they are interred. 
It is the fact that the United States Government anu people have 
the means to open the door for many of them, but have not done 
so.... If we aro to remain the leading nation of our world, we 
also have a deep morel obligation not to be too exclusive."
"Press opinion was generally sympathetic 
to plans for permitting entrance of displaced 
porsons into the United States. The New York
took the position on October 1, 1 9A6 that 
'our fighting men displayed during the war a 
devotion to human liberty. Their relatives at 
home felt the same devotion. For Europe's 
displaced populations the war is not yet triumph­
ant. We can speak more convincingly for freedom 
everywhere when we have done our fair share - 
even more than our fair share - to bring real 
freedom to those who have suffered most.'"275
"A major obstacle in the public uomain was what may well be
called a post-war reaction of hysteria, culminating in a phobia
276about security." r It appears that many American citizens were 
a ’raid that admission of refugees meant admission of communists.
If this wa6 not a concern of the citizens of ths United States,
then housing and unemployment were. As previously discussed,
V.'illiam Green, President of the A.F.L. testified at the Stratton 
bill hearings that entrance of these D.P.'s into the United States 
would not hurt the economy.
The C.G.D.P. tried to dissuade the worries of housing prob­
lems. "The C.C.D.P. simply admitted that there was a temporary 
shortage, which would mean that initial shelter for the D.P.'s 
who had no relatives or friends would probably not be too satis­
factory. In due course, they would find adequate housing and 
might even contribute to the housing construction industry.
Finally, public opinion began to turn around. "Both political 
parties incorporateu the D.P. is ue into their 191+8 political plat­
forms, advocating liberalization."2™
At the hearings of the Senate Subcommittee to amend the 
Displaced Persons Act in 1930, the effects of this changed att­
itude become more obvious. Many more witnesses were in favor of 
this legislation than in the previous hearings which wore held on 
other proposed J.P. immigration bills.
As a result of this legislation, "major segments of the American 
people were changed.... Labor, which for years had opposed immig­
ration, now saw immigrants in a new light.... From then on, labor 
took a consistently liberal attitude toward immigration reform."2'*' 
There were several contributing factors to the changing att­
itudes of Americans. The United States finally realized that by 
allowing D.P.'s to enter, the other nations would uo their share.
It became apparent after the war, that the U.S.S.R. was the only 
other major power to contend with. Because of this, Americans re­
alized the need to show their nation as a leader. It was felt that
o t h e r  w e a k e r  n a t i o n s  would th e n  f o l l o w  t h e  U n ite d  S t a t e s .
A m e r ic a n s  w a n t e -  to show t h a t  we were t h e  champions o f  f r e e  
p e o p l o ,  u n l i k e  th e  R u s s i a n s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  Unite:.  S t a t e s  r e a l i z e d  
t h a t  th e  o n l y  way t o  h ave  a  l a s t i n g  p e a c e  i n  E u ro p e  woulu be to  
e v a c u a t e  th e  o . P . ’ s .  The U . S .  was t r y i n g  to  ad van ce i t s  p o l i c i e s  
f o r  p e a c e  on ..’e s t e r n  E u r o p e .  As tho f i n a l  r e p o r t  o f  th e  U i s p l a c e d  
P e r s o n s  Commission s t a t e d ,  " i n  a  v e r y  r e a l  s e n s e ,  a  d i s p l a c e d
pgn
p e r s o n s  program was n e c e s s a r y  to  h e l p  p r e s e r v e  th e  p e a c e " .
A m e rican  c i t i z e n s  r e a l i z e d  t h i s  and i t  h e l p e d  to  change t h e i r  
o p i n i o n s  on a d m is s io n  o f  D . P . ' s  h e r e .
*V. CollCLUSIGhS
American attitudes and actions with regard to the refugee 
crisis in the era of the Second World war is not something which 
the Unite:. States shoula be prouu of. It took this nation twenty- 
six years to revise its discriminatory immigration policy. Seven­
teen of those twonty-six years were extremely difficult times for 
millions of people in Europe. At this same time, the United States 
had room for immigrants, but would not take them.
Of course, there is no way to measure the effect of such a 
restrictive policy. Wo cannot determine how many lives would have 
been saved or how much less suffering there would have been on the 
part of the victims. It is safe to assume that a substantial 
number coul-> have been saved, hau the United States und the other 
western nations done something to liberalize their immigration 
policies. However, there are many incalculable factors which would 
have taken their toll. For example, would the Germans havo sunk 
the ships carrying the refugees to safety if they coulo have been 
admitted here? They did torpedo at least two, that we are aware 
of. Furthermore, we do not know what course of action the Germans 
would have taken if the western democracies had agreed to take the 
refugees.
There are several conclusions which we can draw in regard to 
this. First of all, it has been stated time and again that Hitler's 
original plan was to purge Greater Germany of Jews and other "undes­
irables" by forced emigration. When the democracies aid not coop­
erate, and the emigration program appearea to the Germans to be 
taking place too slowly, the extermination program was invoked.
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If this is true, then the number who could have been saved had 
they had somewhere to go, would most likely have been in the 
millions. Thic does not mean that millions woulc have come to 
the United States, but it does mean that millions woulc have 
been spread across the western hemisphere.
Of course, this is all speculation. If Hitler really had 
intended to purge the Jews and others from Qermany only through 
emigration, then why did he lock many of them in concentration 
camps years before the war broke out.
It should seem appurent that the Germans knew, from the begin­
ning, that no other nation woulc take the expellees. Hitler demon­
strated this through the voyage of the St. Louis. Thic proved 
that even in 1939, no one woulc. accept these expellees. By sending 
a relatively small number of refugees (936) to the dost and seeing 
them refuseu admission, that proved that even larger groups were 
destined for doom. In this way, the Gormans could use the United 
states and. other nationc as a scapegoat by saying that Germany 
tried to send them to the Americas, but the Americans did not let 
them in. The voyage of the St. Louis was supposed to end in Cuba. 
When Cuba refused to admit the passengers, the ship drifted off 
of the coast of Miami for several days, but our government did 
nothing to aid those people.
Naturally, it was herd for those Americans who were at home 
leading normal lives to imagine what the type of suffering that 
these people were forced to endure was like. However, it is dif­
ficult to understand the apathy of the United States when bringing 
the refugees in would not have had an adverse effect on the economy.
Reports of what was going on in Germany were getting out. If 
people here could not have believed them in the beginning of the
crisis, then surely by 1942 they oust have. Henry Morgenthau,
Jr. stated that our government had confirmed reports of the 
atrocities by 1942. Even by that time, a policy still was not 
invoke, to aid the refugees. The American people simply were 
not motivated to aid these people. The rostrictionist ideals 
carrie.; over from the nineteen-twenties seemed to have worked 
themselves into American feeling so well that no amount of opp­
ression in Europe could appear bud enough to revise the restriction- 
ist sentiment.
Tho fact that our government did not act is not an admirable 
fact either. It seems as though bureaucracy here worked so well 
that it seemed to sanction anti-refugee policy almost by itself.
In at least two cases, the heads of departments wore not anti­
refugee, but the actions carried on in those departments seems 
to have been. In the case of the Department of State, Cordell 
Hull was not aware of the occurrences in his department until 
an outsider informed him of thorn. For quite u perio;. of time, 
Brecld.nridge Long and his associates were able to carry out a 
policy 'which war. unfavorable to the refugees trying to get to 
the United States.
Long and others in the State Department were quite succes­
sful with thoir plan. IIow anyone could be so insensitive as to 
stifle reports of the atrocities in Europe that were coming in 
at the time of Long's rule is a wonder. Or maybe it isn't.
Numerous people dropped hints of anti-semitiem on the part of Long 
throughout his administration.
Yet the case of Breckinridge Long and the State Department 
was not the only one of its kind. In the Department of War a similar
A lth o u g h  G e n e r a l  E is e n h o w e r  had i s .  uout y p e  o f  t h i n g  o c o u r r e u .  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  to  c l e a n - u p  the d i s p l a c e d  p e r s o n s  camps anu o p e r a t i o n s  
liir. s u b o r d in a t e  p e r so n n e l  went ab o u t  t h i n g s  i n  t h e i r  own way.
C r d e r c  were evaded an., meant n o t l in g  when th e  d . P . ' s  and G . I . ' s  
were on a one to  one b a s i s .  I t  i s  a  r e a s o n a b l e  assum p tion  to  
s a y  t h a t  a n t i - s e m i t i s m  p la y e d  a p a r t  h e r e  a l s o .
F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t  d id  h i s  p a r t  to  p r e v e n t  r e f u g e e  
im m ig r a t io n  a l s o .  I f  he d i d n ' t  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  t r y  to  p r e v e n t  i t ,  
h i s  b e h a v i o r  seemed to  make i t  a p p e a r  t h a t  he wanted to  do s o .   ^
a lt h o u g h  F . D . R .  may h ave  been a  go cm. l e a d e r  i n  most o t h e r  r e s p e c t s ,  
h i s  r e f u g e e  p o l i c i e s  were h a r d l y  b e n e f i c i a l  f o r  the v i c t i m s  o f  
German o p p r e s s i o n .  R o o s e v e l t ' s  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  the r e f u g e e  c r i s i s  
were l i t t l e  more than s t a l l i n g  t a c t i c s ,  to postpone s o l u t i o n s  to  
th e  problem alm ost i n d e f i n e t e l y .  The E v i a n  C o n fe r e n c e  war. a  
mockery a s  was the Bermuda C o n f e r e n c e .  F . 'd .R .  knew t h a t  through  
t h e s e  c o n f e r e n c e s  he c o u ld  s u c c e s s f u l l y  s t a l l  t h e  problem by  
making i t  a p p e a r  t h a t  a  s o l u t i o n  was b e i n g  worker o u t .
And i f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o l u t i o n  to  th e  problem was not p o s­
s i b l e ,  F . D . f i .  was not w i l l i n g  to  in v o k e  a d o m e stic  s o l u t i o n .  
R o o s e v e l t  knew how to  p l a y  p o l i t i c s .  He was n o t about to  J e o p ­
a r d i z e  h i s  p o s i t i o n  o r  l o s e  any power o r  p o p u l a r i t y  by a l l o w i n g  
L i . P . ' s  from Europe i n t o  t h i s  c o u n t r y .  By u s i n g  h i s  s t a l l i n g  t a c ­
t i c s ,  ho was a b l e  t o  ap p ease  th o s e  on both s i d e s  o f  th e i s s u e .
The r c s t r i c t i o n i s t s  c o u ld  bo t o l d  t h a t  what he was do ing was  
s t a l l i n g  anu the a n t i —r e o t r i c l ^ i o n i s t s  coul u bo t  o l  th a t  he was
w o rk in g on a  s o l u t i o n .  F . D . R .  n e v e r  once p r e s s e d  C o n g r e s s  f o r  
a  change i n  im m ig r a t io n  l e g i s l a t i o n .  He n e v e r  even atte m p te d  
t o  go around th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  on th e  groun ds t h a t  th e  s i t u a t i o n
was an emergency. The only instance in which this was (..one was
i n  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a r e f u g e e  s h e l t e r  a t  F o r t  O n t a r i o .  A lth o u g h  
i t  was a good dec ., to have a d m itt e d  l e s s  th an  one thousand r e f u g e e s ,  
i t  wa: not. som ething t h a t  would c o n t r i b u t e  to  th e  s o l u t i o n  o f  the
p r „ o i  ora.
The c a s e  o f  the r e f u g e e  s h e l t e r  a t  F o r t  O n t a r io  wan n o t h in g  
more than a token a c t i o n .  Ono t h a t  woulu come i n  handy a t  some 
l a t e r  time when someone asked why the U n ite d  S t a t e s  d i d n ' t  ao 
a n y t h in g  to  h e lp  th e  r e f u g e e s .  The a d m is s io n  o f  such a sm all  
number o f  th e s e  p e o p le  woulu a g a i n  appease the r e s t r i c t i o n i s t s  
be cau se  th e y  knew t h a t  the group  was a  to k e n .
The c a s e  o f  F r e n i s e n t  Truman was q u i t e  i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  
o f  R o o s e v e l t .  Truman worked to  a id  the . . i s p l a c e .  p e r so n s  g r e a t l y .  
He did not h e s i t a t e  to  c a l l  on C o n g re s s  f o r  a  change i n  im m ig r a t io n  
p o l i c y .  Truman made a p o in t  o f  e m p h asizin g  the f a c t  t h a t  O . P . ' s  
coulc. be a u n it t e . i  w ith  s p e c i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  a s  an emergency m easu re.  
..hen C o n g re s s  i  n . i . . >r • '  ■.< -c-.fci. f a c t o r y  b i l l ,  he asko ; them 
to  r e v i s e  i t .
Truman did  h ave to work a g a i n s t  the r e c t r i c t i o n i s t s .  i n  
the e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  h i s  term t h e r e  was a  s t r o n g  r e s t r i c t i o n i s t  
f e a l i n g  w hich p r e v a i l e d .  Truman d id  not w o r r y  about compromising  
h i s  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  b e c a u s e  o f  i t .  When, problem s o c c u r r e d  i n  
t h e D . P .  camps he worked to  h ave  them c o r r e c t e d .
T h e re  a r e  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  why A m erican p o l i c y  was f i n a l l y  
r e v i s e d  to a l lo w  f o r  immigration o f  d i s p l a c e s  p e r s o n s .  At th e  
end o f  the w a r,  the f a c t s  about how many p e o p le  were i n  the c o n -  
c e n t r a t i o n  camps and what t h o s e  c o n d i t i o n s  were l i k e  were r e v e a l e d  
by the U . S .  Army a s  i t  l i b e r a t e d  them. T h ese f a c t s  were r e l e a s e d
an;', o f  f o r t e  were mawc by c e r t a i n  group:; to make th e  p u b l i c  aware  
o f  thorn.
h ow ever,  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  ha.. an even more 
im p o r ta n t  e f f e c t  on our J . P .  p o l i c y .
At the end. o f  the w a r,  a vacuum ha-, o c c u r r e d .  The U n it e -  
S t a t e s  came to the r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  the S o v i e t  Union was the o n ly  
o t h e r  m a jo r  power we would have to  contend w i t h .  The o t h e r  n a t i o n s  
such as G r e a t  B r i t a i n  and F r a n c e  were weakened by the war anu a i u  
not pose a s  any k in d  o f  a  aominant f o r c e  i n  the w o rld  p o l i t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n ,  a s  t h e y  had p r e v i o u s l y .
The Unii,o-. S t a t e s  r e a l i z e . ,  t h a t  t h i s  was the time to be a 
1 :  ?. c r .  ,ur n a t i o n  was . .coply concerned, w ith  k e e p in g  a s  much 
o f  .uropc a s  p o s s i b l e  d e m o c r a t i c .  T h i s  i n c l u d e d  the Germany which  
w o u l-  r e s u l t  a f t e r  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  with  many E a s t e r n  European  
n a t i o n s  f a l l i n g  under S o v i e t  d o m in atio n , the U n ite d  S t a t e s  had to  
a c t  to r e t a i n  the a l l i a n c e  o f  the w e s t e r n  n a t i o n s  and to i n s u r e  
t h a t  th ey  were . .o ra o cracics .
3 y  a l l o w i n g  the d i s p l a c e d  persons, to  come i n t o  the U n ited  
S t a t e s ,  we would be h e l p i n g  our own c a u se  i n  E u ro p e .
T h i s  would be a c c o m p lis h e d  i n  s e v e r a l  w a y s .  F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  
we would be showing t h a t  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  was a  l e a d e r  by t a k i n g  
the i n i t i a t i v e  i n  the r e f u g e e  c r i s i s .  S e c o n d l y ,  the United S t a t e s  
would be a i d i n g  E u ro p e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  Germany e c o n o m i c a l l y .  The 
more e . P . ' s  t h a t  came to  the U n ited  S t a t e s ,  the l e s s  Europe woulu 
h ave to  contend w ith  i t s e l f .  T h i s  was v e r y  im p o r ta n t  i n  an a l r e a d y  
w a r - s h a t t e r e d  economy. T h i r d ,  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  c o u ld  show the  
w o r l d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the d e m o c r a tic  w o r l d ,  t h a t  i t  had done i t s  p a r t  
i n  th e r e f u g e e  c r i s i s .  I n  t h i s  w ay, we woulc. be e x o n e r a t e d  from
any g u i l t  o f  h a v i n g  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  the p l i g h t  o f  t h e s e  p e o p le .
F i n a l l y ,  a l o n g  t h e s e  same l i n e s ,  was the problem o f  Germany 
i t s e l f .  The r e f u g e e s  i n  Gcrmuny woro n o t b e in g  a c c e p t o r  by th e  
German p e o p l e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  a l a r g e  t h r e a t  r e s u l t e d  to  any l a s t i n g  
peace i n  Germany. Had the Germans d c c id e w  t h a t  t h e y  -dd not want  
to  conten:. w ith  the d i s p l a c e s  p e r s o n s ,  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  co u ld  have  
become b i l l i g e r e n t  toward Germany f o r  h a v i n g  t r i e d  to  push th e  
D . P . ' s  on them. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  Germans d id  not want to  a b so rb  
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